The DOI matches its Crossref record; 63 of the 63 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and Political Stability
Abstract
In many resource-dependent states, elites may face an important trade-off between the economic benefits of diversification and the possibility for future political competition that diversification may engender. However, distinctive features of global resource markets and national political economies may make diversification more or less attractive to political elites. The author argues that in three cases which illustrate the equilibrium paths of the game-theoretic model developed here—postindependence Bostwana, Mobutu’s Zaire, and Suharto’s Indonesia—three variables influenced elites’ incentives for diversification and thereby shaped outcomes along the dimensions of political stability and economic performance: the world market structure for the resource, the degree of societal opposition to elites, and the prior development of the nonresource private sector. These countries’ varied paths from resource wealth to political and economic outcomes suggest the need for conditional theories of the resource curse.
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Cites
Greed and grievance in civil war
Collier, P. (2004) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064 · Cited by 6,101
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
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Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995
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Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
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The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
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Cited by
Gartzke, E. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00244.x · Cited by 744
Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq
Berman, E., Shapiro, J. N., & Felter, J. H. (2011) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/661983 · Cited by 694
Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data
EGOROV, G., GURIEV, S., & SONIN, K. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990219 · Cited by 546
Natural resources and violent conflict: resource abundance, dependence, and the onset of civil wars
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Leader behaviour and the natural resource curse
Caselli, F., & Cunningham, T. (2009) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpp023 · Cited by 187
Metadata
- Authors
- Dunning, T.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2005-08
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 451-482
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2128956132
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 63
- FWCI
- 14.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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