The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 15 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy
Open accessAbstract
Governments unable to make credible promises hinder economic development and effective policymaking. Scholars have focused considerable attention on checks and balances and the delegation of authority to independent agencies as institutional solutions to this problem. The political conditions under which these institutions enhance credibility, rather than policy stability, are still unclear, however. We show that checks—multiple veto players—enhance credibility, depending on the extent of uncertainty about the location of the status quo, on how agenda control is allocated among the veto players, and on whether veto players have delegated policymaking authority to independent agencies. In the context of monetary policy and independent central banks, we find evidence supporting the following predictions: Delegation is more likely to enhance credibility and political replacements of central bank governors are less likely in the presence of multiple political veto players; this effect increases with the polarization of veto players.We have benefited from the generous advice of many people, including Alberto Alesina, Tim Besley, Georgios Chortareas, Roberta Gatti, Simon Hug, Stephan Haggard, Witold Henisz, Aart Kraay, Francesca Recanatini, and Mary Shirley, and from comments of seminar participants at DELTA (Paris), George Mason, and Oxford. Three anonymous referees and the editor were especially helpful. This paper's findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of The World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent.
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48 Own result · 34 Own interpretation · 11 Own method · 11 No basis given · 9 Sources not found · 3 Not checked yet · 2 No full text of the sources · 1 Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Using J-tests first proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981), we rejected the GDP specification in favor of the original specifications in Table 1 regressions 2-4.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) source
The citation identifies the origin of the J-test, not the citing authors’ GDP regression results. The Conclusion says Davidson and MacKinnon proposed the test procedures and specifically describes the J-test; the GDP rejection is the citing authors’ own finding. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Supported
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In the paper
“we find evidence supporting the following predictions: delegation is more likely to enhance credibility and political replacements of central bank governors are less likely in the presence of multiple political veto players; this effect increases with the polarization of veto players.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“These tests use new data both on political institutions and on political polarization and show that multiple veto players can increase credibility (reduce inflation)”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“that legal central bank independence is more likely to reduce inflation in the presence of multiple political veto players”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“we find evidence supporting the following predictions: delegation is more likely to enhance credibility and political replacements of central bank governors are less likely in the presence of multiple political veto players; this effect increases with the polarization of veto players.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“and that all of these effects strengthen when political veto players are more polarized.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“we find evidence supporting the following predictions: delegation is more likely to enhance credibility and political replacements of central bank governors are less likely in the presence of multiple political veto players; this effect increases with the polarization of veto players.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Third, policy credibility is sensitive to the decision making rules.If the agenda setter is the veto player who has the least incentive to renege on policy commitments (in this case, is most inflation-averse), the addition of a second veto player has little effect on credibility.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > N A b <
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In the paper
“The addition of a second veto player always reduces expected inflation provided interests of the two veto players are divergent; as the third result predicts, this effect is much stronger when the non-agenda setter is less inflation tolerant than the agenda setter.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > N A b <
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The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Veto players matter less in a more uncertain environment.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > N A b <
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- It may state two separate claims as one. 23
- Probably not a substantial claim. 22
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The interaction term CBI*polcon is negative and statistically significant.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Predictions 1 and 2: checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence
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In the paper
“Second, the addition of a second, non-agenda setting veto player increases policy credibility, with the effect rising in the magnitude of the preference differences between the two veto players.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > N A b <
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This result in Regression 4 is also robust to the linear inclusion of log check to the regression.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Predictions 1 and 2: checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“The coefficient on the interaction term CBI*political polarization in Regression 4 is negative and statistically significant, supporting Prediction 2.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Predictions 1 and 2: checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the coefficient on log check is negative and significant”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Predictions 1 and 2: checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In each of the three regressions the interaction term has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant for log check and political constraints.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Prediction 3: checks and balances, polarization, and political influence on central banks
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Empirically, in our sample we find little evidence that central bank independence is endogenous to lagged inflation, nor is CBI endogenous to contemporary inflation.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“one veto player 0.002 (0.077) 0.238 (0.110) two veto players -0.116 (0.088) -0.094 (0.058) three veto players -0.208 (0.116) -0.182 (0.066)”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
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In the paper
“Our results are also robust to two other variables omitted in Table 1, and to the exclusion of influential outliers.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
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In the paper
“However, when entered into our Table 1 regressions, the log of real GDP per capita is never significant and leaves the estimates of the interaction terms nearly unchanged.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“In regression 5 we rejected the political polarization specification in favor of the GDP specification.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Results of Lagrange multiplier tests suggest serial correlation of the error terms might have led to inconsistent estimates of standard errors in the tests in Table 1.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The coefficients on both proxies for the number of veto players are negative and significant, as is the coefficient on political polarization.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Prediction 3: checks and balances, polarization, and political influence on central banks
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“However, the conditional standard error of this effect is quite sizeable in all regressions -even at very high levels of checks and balances, it is impossible to reject the hypothesis that the effect is zero.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Prediction 3: checks and balances, polarization, and political influence on central banks
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“CEO * log check -.518 (.299)”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
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In the paper
“We show that checks -multiple veto players -enhance credibility, depending on the extent of uncertainty about the location of the status quo, on how agenda control is allocated among the veto players, and on whether veto players have delegated policy making authority to independent agencies.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
plainconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Our results suggest that politicians might also delegate to increase policy credibility, but that delegation has this effect only in the presence of multiple veto players with polarized preferences.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“emphasizing, for example, that the effects of additional veto players on policy outcomes depend on whether their preferences diverge from those of existing veto players.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Tsebelis (1995, 2002)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In the analysis that follows, we show that policy credibility varies with the number and polarization of preferences of veto players, but the underlying logic is different.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
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In the paper
“We also follow Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) and include decade dummy variables to control for unobserved characteristics specific to each time period.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“In addition, unlike political constraints, the checks variable is explicitly incremented when a party in the government has an economic policy orientation closer to that of the main opposition party than to that of the party of the executive.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Keefer (2002)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Qualitative evidence emerging from specific instances of confrontation between central bankers and political decision makers provides further support for the analysis here.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Cases of conflict from the Bundesbank and the Fed
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The model underlines the importance of taking political institutions and preferences into account when examining the impact of administrative arrangements such as central bank independence.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing the hypotheses
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In the paper
“Multiple veto players therefore can increase policy credibility as well as policy stability.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > N A b <
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In the paper
“This follows Romer (1993), who argues that as imports increase as a share of total consumption, policy makers have less of an ex post incentive to inflate.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Romer (1993) source
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In the paper
“This is Prediction 3, which has also not been previously tested and provides supporting evidence for the primary thesis that central bank independence depends on checks and balances.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing the hypotheses
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In the paper
“Tsebelis (2002) argues persuasively that the number of veto players affects policy only insofar as the veto players have divergent policy preferences.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing the hypotheses
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Tsebelis (2002)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
boostedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Our results suggest that legal independence can reduce inflation bias in both developed and developing countries, but that this depends on the level of checks and balances in a country's political system.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Predictions 1 and 2: checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“To be consistent with this condition, tests of Proposition 1 must therefore treat veto players with the same preferences as only a single veto player.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing the hypotheses
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“In addition, however, since it takes a value of zero for systems with only one veto player, it is simultaneously a proxy for the number of veto players in a country.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
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In the paper
“They have the advantage of being based on objective criteria and of capturing the existence of coalition governments or divided control of two chambers in a bicameral system.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
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- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Both of these indicators rise with the number of veto points (depending upon the number of legislative chambers) and fall when the veto points are occupied by the same political party (depending on whether majorities are multi-party coalitions).”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Prediction 2, regarding the effect of increasing polarization among veto players, has not been previously tested.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing the hypotheses
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Delegation improves policy credibility because it is more difficult for multiple veto players to agree to overturn an agency's decision than their own.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing the hypotheses
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“As we do, they argue that multiple veto players in government make it more difficult to reverse a decision to delegate, giving independent central banks greater scope to reduce the inflation bias.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > A review of solutions to the credibility problem in monetary policy
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Lohmann (1998)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Moser (1999) source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
- Not matched
In the paper
“Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) argue that high turnover of central bank governors is indicative of low independence, and they show that the rate of turnover is positively and significantly correlated with inflation in a sample including both developed and developing countries.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
- Not matched
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“A number of papers have found a statistically significant relationship between legal measures of central bank independence and inflation in advanced industrialized economies.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Predictions 1 and 2: checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
In the paper
“However, the analysis above is consistent with substantial research, beginning with Rogoff (1985), that shows that even an inflation-tolerant political actor might prefer to delegate authority to a conservative central banker in the presence of unpredictable economic shocks.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Why are independent central banks created?
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Rogoff (1985) source
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“What if v 1 or v 2 were the only veto player?Then policy would always be at their preferred outcome, with or without the central bank; any attempt by the central bank to propose a different inflation rate would be immediately overridden by the single veto player.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Discretionary monetary policy under checks and balances
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Delegation enhances credible commitment, and does so the more divergent are the interests of the competing veto players and, especially, the closer are the interests of the non-agenda setter to those of the agency to which authority has been delegated.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The central bank is more inflation-averse than either of the political actors.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The most inflation-averse veto player prefers the outcome under checks and balances to the most preferred outcome of the central banker.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The economic shock ε is distributed uniformly over the range [-c, c].
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Knowing this, the Fed was able to pursue a more aggressive policy than the veto players preferred.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Cases of conflict from the Bundesbank and the Fed
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The evidence presented in this section indicates that these do not provide plausible alternative explanations of our empirical findings.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The evidence for many of these points is direct and, unlike much of the empirical evidence in this area it derives from diverse institutional settings in the developed and developing world.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
The paper relies on this without support.
Governments unable to make credible commitments cannot stimulate economic growth (and tax collections) by promising a stable tax and regulatory environment.
“When governments are unable to make credible commitments (e.g., to follow a set of rules tomorrow that they announce today), they cannot stimulate economic growth (and tax collections) by, for example, promising a stable tax and regulatory environment for firms.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Private actors form inflation expectations and write contracts before the government sets monetary policy.
“Before the government actually sets monetary policy, however, private actors must form inflation expectations and write contracts governing the future sale of goods and services.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
There is one player with agenda-setting authority—the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other player.
“We assume throughout the paper that there is one player with agenda-setting authority -the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other player.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The default inflation outcome confronting politicians is endogenous: it is the product of private sector decisions made in anticipation of politicians' decisions.
“the default outcome we employ in the models below -the inflation that prevails in the absence of government action in the second period -is the set of price increases programmed by the private sector into its contracts in the first period.”
“the status quo here is endogenous: the default inflation outcome confronting politicians is the product of private sector decisions that are made in anticipation of the decisions of politicians.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The private sector does not observe the random supply shock.
“However, the private sector does not observe the random supply shock, and therefore cannot know for sure what decision the veto players will make upon observing the private sector's contracts.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The central bank has no informational or other advantages over the government.
“Delegation to a central bank is traditionally analyzed within the context of the single veto player model outlined above, where the central bank has no informational or other advantages over the government.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The central bank, rather than the private sector, sets the default rate of inflation that political veto players must accept if they choose not to override it.
“The key attribute of an independent central bank is that it, rather than the private sector, sets the default rate of inflation that political veto players must accept if they choose not to override it.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Central bank independence is treated as exogenous.
“These examples provide a justification for the decision made in this paper to treat central bank independence as exogenous.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The six months following changes in government is a period where any political influence on central bank governors is most likely to be exercised.
“Cukierman and Webb (1995) collect data on the frequency with which central bank governors are replaced in the six months following changes in government, a period where any political influence is most likely to be exercised.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The central bank is more inflation-averse than either of the political actors.
“First, the central bank is assumed to be more inflation-averse than either of the political actors”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The most inflation-averse veto player prefers the outcome under checks and balances to the most preferred outcome of the central banker.
“Third, to avoid trivial cases, the most inflation-averse veto player prefers the outcome under checks and balances to the most preferred outcome of the central banker.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The economic shock ε is distributed uniformly over the range [-c, c].
“assume ε is distributed uniformly over the range[-c, c].”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The probabilities of the four decision making outcomes sum to one.
“where the q i 's are the probabilities of each of the four decision making outcomes and sum to one”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“there is consensus in theory and practice that monetary policy faces commitment problems and that granting independence to the monetary policy authority can help overcome them with the right institutional design (see Keefer and Stasavage 2003).”
From Independent Agencies, Distribution, and Legitimacy: The Case of Central Banks (2020) · cites this paper as Keefer and Stasavage 2003
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
“Cukierman and Webb (1995) collect data on the frequency with which central bank governors are replaced in the six months following changes in government”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Prediction 3: checks and balances, polarization, and political influence on central banks
“which measures the frequency with which central bank governors are replaced in the six months following elections.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Appendix 2: Derivation of expected inflation under checks and balances
“This results in the exclusion of only 4 potential observations from our Table 3 regressions.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
“Table 3 Estimated effect on log inflation of a one-standard deviation increase in central bank independence”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
“Results of Lagrange multiplier tests suggest serial correlation of the error terms might have led to inconsistent estimates of standard errors in the tests in Table 1.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
“Table 1 Setting monetary policy in four institutional frameworks”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
“In regression 5 we rejected the political polarization specification in favor of the GDP specification.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
“Table 2 Checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence Dependent variable: log inflation (1) (2) (3) (4)”
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Metadata
- Authors
- KEEFER, P., & STASAVAGE, D.
- Affiliations
- World Bank (US)
- London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2003-08
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 03
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2132773002
- Cited by
- 636
- References
- 57
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 53 · 2019: 34 · 2018: 42 · 2017: 28 · 2016: 52 · 2015: 33 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 30 · 2012: 32
- FWCI
- 33.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Global Financial Crisis and Policies
- Keywords
- veto players, central bank independence, monetary policy credibility, delegation, checks and balances, agenda control, political polarization, central bank governors, policy stability, independent agencies
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-11, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-11 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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