The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 15 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy
Open accessAbstract
Governments unable to make credible promises hinder economic development and effective policymaking. Scholars have focused considerable attention on checks and balances and the delegation of authority to independent agencies as institutional solutions to this problem. The political conditions under which these institutions enhance credibility, rather than policy stability, are still unclear, however. We show that checks—multiple veto players—enhance credibility, depending on the extent of uncertainty about the location of the status quo, on how agenda control is allocated among the veto players, and on whether veto players have delegated policymaking authority to independent agencies. In the context of monetary policy and independent central banks, we find evidence supporting the following predictions: Delegation is more likely to enhance credibility and political replacements of central bank governors are less likely in the presence of multiple political veto players; this effect increases with the polarization of veto players.We have benefited from the generous advice of many people, including Alberto Alesina, Tim Besley, Georgios Chortareas, Roberta Gatti, Simon Hug, Stephan Haggard, Witold Henisz, Aart Kraay, Francesca Recanatini, and Mary Shirley, and from comments of seminar participants at DELTA (Paris), George Mason, and Oxford. Three anonymous referees and the editor were especially helpful. This paper's findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of The World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent.
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48 Own result · 34 Own interpretation · 11 Own method · 11 No basis given · 9 Sources not found · 3 Not checked yet · 2 No full text of the sources · 1 Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Using J-tests first proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981), we rejected the GDP specification in favor of the original specifications in Table 1 regressions 2-4.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) source
The citation identifies the origin of the J-test, not the citing authors’ GDP regression results. The Conclusion says Davidson and MacKinnon proposed the test procedures and specifically describes the J-test; the GDP rejection is the citing authors’ own finding. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Supported
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In the paper
“we find evidence supporting the following predictions: delegation is more likely to enhance credibility and political replacements of central bank governors are less likely in the presence of multiple political veto players; this effect increases with the polarization of veto players.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“These tests use new data both on political institutions and on political polarization and show that multiple veto players can increase credibility (reduce inflation)”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“that legal central bank independence is more likely to reduce inflation in the presence of multiple political veto players”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“we find evidence supporting the following predictions: delegation is more likely to enhance credibility and political replacements of central bank governors are less likely in the presence of multiple political veto players; this effect increases with the polarization of veto players.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“and that all of these effects strengthen when political veto players are more polarized.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“we find evidence supporting the following predictions: delegation is more likely to enhance credibility and political replacements of central bank governors are less likely in the presence of multiple political veto players; this effect increases with the polarization of veto players.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Third, policy credibility is sensitive to the decision making rules.If the agenda setter is the veto player who has the least incentive to renege on policy commitments (in this case, is most inflation-averse), the addition of a second veto player has little effect on credibility.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > N A b <
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In the paper
“The addition of a second veto player always reduces expected inflation provided interests of the two veto players are divergent; as the third result predicts, this effect is much stronger when the non-agenda setter is less inflation tolerant than the agenda setter.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > N A b <
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The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Veto players matter less in a more uncertain environment.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > N A b <
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- It may state two separate claims as one. 23
- Probably not a substantial claim. 22
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The interaction term CBI*polcon is negative and statistically significant.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Predictions 1 and 2: checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence
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In the paper
“Second, the addition of a second, non-agenda setting veto player increases policy credibility, with the effect rising in the magnitude of the preference differences between the two veto players.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > N A b <
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This result in Regression 4 is also robust to the linear inclusion of log check to the regression.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Predictions 1 and 2: checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“The coefficient on the interaction term CBI*political polarization in Regression 4 is negative and statistically significant, supporting Prediction 2.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Predictions 1 and 2: checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the coefficient on log check is negative and significant”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Predictions 1 and 2: checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In each of the three regressions the interaction term has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant for log check and political constraints.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Prediction 3: checks and balances, polarization, and political influence on central banks
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Empirically, in our sample we find little evidence that central bank independence is endogenous to lagged inflation, nor is CBI endogenous to contemporary inflation.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“one veto player 0.002 (0.077) 0.238 (0.110) two veto players -0.116 (0.088) -0.094 (0.058) three veto players -0.208 (0.116) -0.182 (0.066)”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
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In the paper
“Our results are also robust to two other variables omitted in Table 1, and to the exclusion of influential outliers.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
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In the paper
“However, when entered into our Table 1 regressions, the log of real GDP per capita is never significant and leaves the estimates of the interaction terms nearly unchanged.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“In regression 5 we rejected the political polarization specification in favor of the GDP specification.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Results of Lagrange multiplier tests suggest serial correlation of the error terms might have led to inconsistent estimates of standard errors in the tests in Table 1.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The coefficients on both proxies for the number of veto players are negative and significant, as is the coefficient on political polarization.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Prediction 3: checks and balances, polarization, and political influence on central banks
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“However, the conditional standard error of this effect is quite sizeable in all regressions -even at very high levels of checks and balances, it is impossible to reject the hypothesis that the effect is zero.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Prediction 3: checks and balances, polarization, and political influence on central banks
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“CEO * log check -.518 (.299)”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
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In the paper
“We show that checks -multiple veto players -enhance credibility, depending on the extent of uncertainty about the location of the status quo, on how agenda control is allocated among the veto players, and on whether veto players have delegated policy making authority to independent agencies.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
plainconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Our results suggest that politicians might also delegate to increase policy credibility, but that delegation has this effect only in the presence of multiple veto players with polarized preferences.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“emphasizing, for example, that the effects of additional veto players on policy outcomes depend on whether their preferences diverge from those of existing veto players.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Tsebelis (1995, 2002)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In the analysis that follows, we show that policy credibility varies with the number and polarization of preferences of veto players, but the underlying logic is different.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Abstract
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In the paper
“We also follow Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) and include decade dummy variables to control for unobserved characteristics specific to each time period.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“In addition, unlike political constraints, the checks variable is explicitly incremented when a party in the government has an economic policy orientation closer to that of the main opposition party than to that of the party of the executive.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Keefer (2002)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Qualitative evidence emerging from specific instances of confrontation between central bankers and political decision makers provides further support for the analysis here.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Cases of conflict from the Bundesbank and the Fed
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The model underlines the importance of taking political institutions and preferences into account when examining the impact of administrative arrangements such as central bank independence.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing the hypotheses
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In the paper
“Multiple veto players therefore can increase policy credibility as well as policy stability.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > N A b <
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In the paper
“This follows Romer (1993), who argues that as imports increase as a share of total consumption, policy makers have less of an ex post incentive to inflate.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Romer (1993) source
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In the paper
“This is Prediction 3, which has also not been previously tested and provides supporting evidence for the primary thesis that central bank independence depends on checks and balances.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing the hypotheses
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In the paper
“Tsebelis (2002) argues persuasively that the number of veto players affects policy only insofar as the veto players have divergent policy preferences.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing the hypotheses
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Tsebelis (2002)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
boostedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Our results suggest that legal independence can reduce inflation bias in both developed and developing countries, but that this depends on the level of checks and balances in a country's political system.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Predictions 1 and 2: checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“To be consistent with this condition, tests of Proposition 1 must therefore treat veto players with the same preferences as only a single veto player.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing the hypotheses
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“In addition, however, since it takes a value of zero for systems with only one veto player, it is simultaneously a proxy for the number of veto players in a country.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
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In the paper
“They have the advantage of being based on objective criteria and of capturing the existence of coalition governments or divided control of two chambers in a bicameral system.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
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- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Both of these indicators rise with the number of veto points (depending upon the number of legislative chambers) and fall when the veto points are occupied by the same political party (depending on whether majorities are multi-party coalitions).”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Prediction 2, regarding the effect of increasing polarization among veto players, has not been previously tested.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing the hypotheses
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Delegation improves policy credibility because it is more difficult for multiple veto players to agree to overturn an agency's decision than their own.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing the hypotheses
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“As we do, they argue that multiple veto players in government make it more difficult to reverse a decision to delegate, giving independent central banks greater scope to reduce the inflation bias.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > A review of solutions to the credibility problem in monetary policy
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Lohmann (1998)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Moser (1999) source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
- Not matched
In the paper
“Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) argue that high turnover of central bank governors is indicative of low independence, and they show that the rate of turnover is positively and significantly correlated with inflation in a sample including both developed and developing countries.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
- Not matched
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“A number of papers have found a statistically significant relationship between legal measures of central bank independence and inflation in advanced industrialized economies.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Predictions 1 and 2: checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
In the paper
“However, the analysis above is consistent with substantial research, beginning with Rogoff (1985), that shows that even an inflation-tolerant political actor might prefer to delegate authority to a conservative central banker in the presence of unpredictable economic shocks.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Why are independent central banks created?
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Rogoff (1985) source
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“What if v 1 or v 2 were the only veto player?Then policy would always be at their preferred outcome, with or without the central bank; any attempt by the central bank to propose a different inflation rate would be immediately overridden by the single veto player.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Discretionary monetary policy under checks and balances
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Delegation enhances credible commitment, and does so the more divergent are the interests of the competing veto players and, especially, the closer are the interests of the non-agenda setter to those of the agency to which authority has been delegated.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The central bank is more inflation-averse than either of the political actors.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The most inflation-averse veto player prefers the outcome under checks and balances to the most preferred outcome of the central banker.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The economic shock ε is distributed uniformly over the range [-c, c].
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Knowing this, the Fed was able to pursue a more aggressive policy than the veto players preferred.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Cases of conflict from the Bundesbank and the Fed
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The evidence presented in this section indicates that these do not provide plausible alternative explanations of our empirical findings.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The evidence for many of these points is direct and, unlike much of the empirical evidence in this area it derives from diverse institutional settings in the developed and developing world.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
The paper relies on this without support.
Governments unable to make credible commitments cannot stimulate economic growth (and tax collections) by promising a stable tax and regulatory environment.
“When governments are unable to make credible commitments (e.g., to follow a set of rules tomorrow that they announce today), they cannot stimulate economic growth (and tax collections) by, for example, promising a stable tax and regulatory environment for firms.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Private actors form inflation expectations and write contracts before the government sets monetary policy.
“Before the government actually sets monetary policy, however, private actors must form inflation expectations and write contracts governing the future sale of goods and services.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
There is one player with agenda-setting authority—the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other player.
“We assume throughout the paper that there is one player with agenda-setting authority -the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other player.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The default inflation outcome confronting politicians is endogenous: it is the product of private sector decisions made in anticipation of politicians' decisions.
“the default outcome we employ in the models below -the inflation that prevails in the absence of government action in the second period -is the set of price increases programmed by the private sector into its contracts in the first period.”
“the status quo here is endogenous: the default inflation outcome confronting politicians is the product of private sector decisions that are made in anticipation of the decisions of politicians.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The private sector does not observe the random supply shock.
“However, the private sector does not observe the random supply shock, and therefore cannot know for sure what decision the veto players will make upon observing the private sector's contracts.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The central bank has no informational or other advantages over the government.
“Delegation to a central bank is traditionally analyzed within the context of the single veto player model outlined above, where the central bank has no informational or other advantages over the government.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The central bank, rather than the private sector, sets the default rate of inflation that political veto players must accept if they choose not to override it.
“The key attribute of an independent central bank is that it, rather than the private sector, sets the default rate of inflation that political veto players must accept if they choose not to override it.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Central bank independence is treated as exogenous.
“These examples provide a justification for the decision made in this paper to treat central bank independence as exogenous.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The six months following changes in government is a period where any political influence on central bank governors is most likely to be exercised.
“Cukierman and Webb (1995) collect data on the frequency with which central bank governors are replaced in the six months following changes in government, a period where any political influence is most likely to be exercised.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The central bank is more inflation-averse than either of the political actors.
“First, the central bank is assumed to be more inflation-averse than either of the political actors”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The most inflation-averse veto player prefers the outcome under checks and balances to the most preferred outcome of the central banker.
“Third, to avoid trivial cases, the most inflation-averse veto player prefers the outcome under checks and balances to the most preferred outcome of the central banker.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The economic shock ε is distributed uniformly over the range [-c, c].
“assume ε is distributed uniformly over the range[-c, c].”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The probabilities of the four decision making outcomes sum to one.
“where the q i 's are the probabilities of each of the four decision making outcomes and sum to one”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“there is consensus in theory and practice that monetary policy faces commitment problems and that granting independence to the monetary policy authority can help overcome them with the right institutional design (see Keefer and Stasavage 2003).”
From Independent Agencies, Distribution, and Legitimacy: The Case of Central Banks (2020) · cites this paper as Keefer and Stasavage 2003
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Data
“Cukierman and Webb (1995) collect data on the frequency with which central bank governors are replaced in the six months following changes in government”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Testing Prediction 3: checks and balances, polarization, and political influence on central banks
“which measures the frequency with which central bank governors are replaced in the six months following elections.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Appendix 2: Derivation of expected inflation under checks and balances
“This results in the exclusion of only 4 potential observations from our Table 3 regressions.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
“Table 3 Estimated effect on log inflation of a one-standard deviation increase in central bank independence”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
“Results of Lagrange multiplier tests suggest serial correlation of the error terms might have led to inconsistent estimates of standard errors in the tests in Table 1.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
“Table 1 Setting monetary policy in four institutional frameworks”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Robustness
“In regression 5 we rejected the political polarization specification in favor of the GDP specification.”
§ The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy > Conclusion
“Table 2 Checks and balances, polarization, and central bank independence Dependent variable: log inflation (1) (2) (3) (4)”
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“by a measure used by Keefer and Stasavage (2004) termed ‘checks’.”
MethodInstitutional distance and local isomorphism strategy
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“To operationalize political distance, we use the CHECKS index drawn from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh, 2001; Keefer & Stasavage, 2003).”
BackgroundMethodThe Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe
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“Keefer and Stasavage (2002, 2003).”
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“The variable was first coded by Keefer and Stasavage (2003), is at minimum one, and further increases the more veto players are involved in legislative decision-making.”
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“Sources: Keefer and Stasavage (2003), but data have been obtained from the data set compiled by Beck et al.”
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Political Polarization as a Constraint on Corruption: A Cross-national Comparison
Brown, D. S., Touchton, M., & Whitford, A. (2011) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.02.006 · Cited by 129
“Although polarization can be measured in a number of different ways, we chose a measure that has been used in previous work (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003). The measure we use was constructed by Beck, et al. (2001) as follows.”
MethodInfluentialDecentralization and Economic Performance in Indonesia
Pepinsky, T. B., & Wihardja, M. M. (2011) · Journal of East Asian Studies · doi:10.1017/s1598240800007372 · Cited by 125
The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors
(2005) · doi:10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00374.x · Cited by 124
“On the other hand, two opposite accounts have been given for the precise role of veto players in relation to delegation.4 Scholars studying central banks (e.g. Keefer and Stasavage 2002, 2003; Moser 1999) have argued that veto players are a precondition for credible delegation.”
BackgroundFitzgerald, J. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108377218 · Cited by 156
Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and EffectivenessPreprint
Meade, E. E., & Crowe, C. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1112030 · Cited by 122
Outside-In: The Effects of External Threat on State Centralization
Gibler, D. M. (2010) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002710370135 · Cited by 118
Testing the ‘Party Matters' Thesis: Explaining Progress Towards Kyoto Protocol Targets
Jensen, C. B., & Spoon, J. (2010) · Political Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00852.x · Cited by 117
“Partisan veto players are political parties that occupy key positions within those institutions (see, for example, Alivizatos, 1995; Bassinger and Hallerberg, 2004; Bawn, 1999; Gilardi, 2002; Keefer and Stasavage, 2003; Thies, 2001; Tsebelis, 1995; 1999; 2002).”
BackgroundWHAT DOES POLITICAL ECONOMY TELL US ABOUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT—AND VICE VERSA?
Keefer, P. E. (2004) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104846 · Cited by 104
“Considerable attention has, however, been dedicated to the role of political checks and balances, which make it difficult for any one political actor to act unilaterally towards citizens, and the 21 Keefer and Stasavage (2003) present another example that makes this point.”
BackgroundSelf-citationGoverning by Panic: The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis
(2014) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2513391 · Cited by 106
Let's speak more? How the ECB responds to public contestation
(2020) · doi:10.1080/13501763.2020.1712457 · Cited by 105
“Indeed, several studies show that central bank independence is endogenous to the political system (Keefer & Stasavage, 2003) and that independence is more likely to be preserved if policymakers face high audience costs for interfering with the central bank’s structure and legal status (Lohmann,…”
BackgroundShall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies
Hanretty, C., & Koop, C. E. (2012) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2012.01156.x · Cited by 112
“These two proxy measures have a long history of application in the literature on central bank independence (Sturm & De Haan 2001; Keefer & Stasavage 2003; Dreher et al. 2008), and are now being applied to the independence of regulatory agencies (Montoya & Trillas 2009; Jordana & Ramió 2010) and…”
BackgroundSoil nitrogen availability, plant luxury consumption, and herbivory by white-tailed deer
Tripler, C. E., Canham, C. D., Inouye, R. S., & Schnurr, J. L. (2002) · Oecologia · doi:10.1007/s00442-002-1046-x · Cited by 100
Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending?
Bodea, C., & Higashijima, M. (2015) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123415000058 · Cited by 78
“54 Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Moser 1999.”
InfluentialCentral banks’ communication as reputation management: How the Fed talks under uncertainty
Moschella, M., & Pinto, L. (2018) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12543 · Cited by 100
“In this case, the agency‘s reputational threats are magnified by threats to the agency‘s autonomy, since political audiences hold the key to revoking central bank independence (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003).”
BackgroundLegitimacy and Accountability of Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Critical Review
Maggetti, M. (2010) · IRIS · Cited by 97
The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform
Gehlbach, S. G., & Malesky, E. J. (2010) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381610000460 · Cited by 114
Institutional distance in international business research
Bae, J.-H., & SALOMON, R. M. (2010) · Advances in international management · doi:10.1108/s1571-5027(2010)00000230020 · Cited by 95
Electoral Systems and the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power
Chang, E. C. C., Kayser, M. A. L. A. D., Linzer, D. A., & Rogowski, R. L. (2010) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511761423 · Cited by 93
Analyzing the Global Political Economy
Walter, A., & Sen, G. (2008) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400837809 · Cited by 96
Gilardi, F. (2007) · Comparative European Politics · doi:10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110098 · Cited by 93
“However, other scholars argue that in systems with few veto players, delegation itself is not credible and useless as a means to cope with political uncertainty, since it can be easily withdrawn (Lohmann, 1998; Keefer and Stasavage, 2003).”
BackgroundIndependent or lonely? Central banking in crisis
Mabbett, D., & Schelkle, W. (2019) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2018.1554539 · Cited by 81
“…systems with multiple veto-players, the central bank enjoys discretion within the boundaries of the polarized preferences of presidents and legislatures, or states in a federation or monetary union (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003; Miller and Whitford, 2016, pp. 101–103; Tsebelis, 1995, p. 307).”
BackgroundPolitical and institutional determinants of immigration policies
Abou‐Chadi, T. (2016) · Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies · doi:10.1080/1369183x.2016.1166938 · Cited by 82
Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises
(2006) · doi:10.1017/s0020818306060073 · Cited by 81
“…democracy variable so that we are capturing “democratic” elections+ 32+ See Leblang 2002, and Leblang 2003; Simmons 1992+ 33+ See Tsebelis 2002; and Keefer and Stasavage 2003+ the FR specification, the percentage of correct predictions goes up from 70 percent to 76 percent ~Table 4!+ When the…”
BackgroundVetoing the future: political constraints and renewable energy
Bayülgen, O., & Ladewig, J. W. (2016) · Environmental Politics · doi:10.1080/09644016.2016.1223189 · Cited by 81
“There are many studies that confirm the effects of veto players (as either positive or negative) on economic policy, such as tax policy (Hallerberg and Basinger 1998), trade policy (Milner 1997, Henisz and Mansfield 2006), and monetary and fiscal policy (Keefer and Stasavage 2003).”
BackgroundThe Institutions Curse: Natural Resources, Politics, and Development
Menaldo, V. (2016) · Cited by 75
Inflation and central bank independence: Two-way causality?
(2011) · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.005 · Cited by 75
Understanding Institutional Weakness: Power and Design in Latin American Institutions
Brinks, D. M., Levitsky, S., & Murillo, M. V. (2019) · Cited by 75
Masciandaro, D., & Romelli, D. (2015) · Financial History Review · doi:10.1017/s0968565015000177 · Cited by 79
Natural resource dependence, non-tradables, and economic growth
Brüeckner, M. (2010) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2010.06.002 · Cited by 70
“GDP, measured in log points in the base year 1970; the average investment rate, also measured in log points; and openness, defined as the fraction of years in which an economy is considered as open according to Sachs and Warner (1995).5 Additional control variables are: the Polity IV revised combined democracy score (…”
BackgroundInfluentialCentral Bank Independence Before and After the Crisis
de Haan, J., Bodea, C., Hicks, R., & Eijffinger, S. C. W. (2018) · Comparative Economic Studies · doi:10.1057/s41294-017-0050-4 · Cited by 71
“…allow the legislation governing the central bank to have a de facto bite, i.e., in countries with strong democratic institutions (Broz 2002; Bodea and Hicks 2015), multiple veto players (Moser 1999; Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Hayo and Voigt 2008) or a strong, free press (Bodea and Hicks 2015).”
BackgroundThe symbolic politics of delegation: macroprudential policy and independent regulatory authorities
(2016) · doi:10.1080/13563467.2016.1198758 · Cited by 71
“…several policy areas, including, for example, telecommunication and monetary policy, and has been used to explain patterns of delegation at both the domestic and international levels (among others Majone 2001, Thatcher and Sweet 2002, Keefer and Stasavage 2003, Pollack 2003, Hawkins et al. 2006).”
BackgroundContracting with Whom? The Differential Effects of Investment Treaties on FDI
Danzman, S. B. (2016) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2016.1121451 · Cited by 73
Weymouth, S. J. (2010) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414010382629 · Cited by 67
“…separation of purpose.3 Subsequent work on the economic effects of veto players emphasizes how these institutions help governments overcome credibility problems resulting from time-inconsistent incentives by making policy changes more difficult (Keefer and Stasavage, 2002, 2003; Stasavage, 2002b).”
(2005) · Cited by 69
Agoba, A., Abor, J., Osei, K., & Sa-Aadu, J. (2020) · Journal of African Business · doi:10.1080/15228916.2019.1584263 · Cited by 73
“Consequently, the credibility of independent central banks to pursue price stability and abide by legal limitations on providing finance to government is enhanced in such situations (Keefer & Stasavage, 2003).”
BackgroundPolitical Institutions, Credible Commitment, and Sovereign Debt in Advanced Economies
Breen, M., & McMenamin, I. (2013) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/isqu.12079 · Cited by 66
von Stein, J. (2020) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s000712342000054x · Cited by 72
“These ideas find support in a wide array of other policy areas, including budget deficits, monetary policy and trade agreements (Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Tsebelis 2002).”
BackgroundCapitalism and labor shares: A cross-country panel study
Young, A. T., & Lawson, R. A. (2013) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.11.006 · Cited by 67
The Political Economy of Reforms in Central Bank Design: Evidence from a New DatasetPreprint
Romelli, D. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3235209 · Cited by 64
“…finds that legal independence is higher in OECD countries with legislative processes characterized by extensive checks and balances, while in Keefer and Stasavage (2003) mon- etary policy credibility (captured by a lower governor turnover rate) is enhanced by the presence of multiple veto…”
Agoba, A. M., Abor, J. Y., Osei, K. A., & Sa‐Aadu, J. (2017) · Central Bank Review · doi:10.1016/j.cbrev.2017.11.001 · Cited by 64
Globalization, Politics, and Financial Turmoil: Asia's Banking Crisis
Satyanath, S. (2009) · Cited by 59
The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence
Hielscher, K., & Markwardt, G. (2012) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.08.004 · Cited by 70
“For example, Keefer and Stasavage (2003) show that the effectiveness of central bank independence in strengthening credibility and enhancing inflation performance is increased by the presence of multiple political veto players.”
Sovereign credit ratings and central banks: Why do analysts pay attention to institutions?
Bodea, C., & Hicks, R. (2018) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/ecpo.12113 · Cited by 63
Making rules credible: divided government and political budget cycles
(2012) · doi:10.1007/s11127-012-9923-2 · Cited by 61
“Depending 1While our focus is on the credibility of rules, Lohmann (1998b) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003) make a related point on the credibility of delegation: an independent central bank, the Rogoff (1985) solution to the time consistency problem of monetary policy, is not credible unless there…”
BackgroundBodea, C., Garriga, A. C., & Higashijima, M. (2017) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/701831 · Cited by 63
Party System Institutionalization, Accountability and Governmental Corruption
Schleiter, P., & Voznaya, A. (2016) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123415000770 · Cited by 62
(2019) · doi:10.1111/twec.12889 · Cited by 60
“In addition, we use checks and balances from Keefer and Stasavage (2003) as an indicator of political constraint.”
Method
Metadata
- Authors
- KEEFER, P., & STASAVAGE, D.
- Affiliations
- World Bank (US)
- London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2003-08
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 03
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2132773002
- Cited by
- 636
- References
- 57
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 53 · 2019: 34 · 2018: 42 · 2017: 28 · 2016: 52 · 2015: 33 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 30 · 2012: 32
- FWCI
- 33.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Global Financial Crisis and Policies
- Keywords
- veto players, central bank independence, monetary policy credibility, delegation, checks and balances, agenda control, political polarization, central bank governors, policy stability, independent agencies
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