The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform
Abstract
We analyze a model of delegation and policymaking in polities where bureaucratic capacity is low. Our analysis suggests that low bureaucratic capacity diminishes incentives for bureaucrats to comply with legislation, making it more difficult for politicians to induce bureaucrats to take actions that politicians desire. Consequently, when bureaucratic capacity is low, standard principles in the theoretical literature on delegation no longer hold. We also use the model to examine the issue of political reform in polities with low bureaucratic capacity. The model indicates that politicians in such polities will be trapped in a situation whereby they have little incentive to undertake reforms of either the bureaucracy or other institutions (such as courts) that are crucial for successful policymaking.
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Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries
Rauch, J. E., & Evans, P. B. (2000) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00044-4 · Cited by 1,227
Cited by
Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise
Gailmard, S., & Patty, J. W. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00286.x · Cited by 496
Defining Bureaucratic Autonomy
Bersch, K., & Fukuyama, F. (2023) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051921-102914 · Cited by 58
Moffitt, S. L., Willse, C., Smith, K. B., & Cohen, D. K. (2023) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592721002012 · Cited by 10
Bellodi, L., Morelli, M., & Vannoni, M. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3805897 · Cited by 7
A political-economic model of police administration
Clark, T. S. (2024) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/729933 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- HUBER, J. D., & McCARTY, N.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2004-08
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 481-494
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2140074439
- Cited by
- 352
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 30.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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