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Cited by 352

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform

HUBER, JOHN D., McCARTY, NOLAN · 2004 · American Political Science Review

Abstract

We analyze a model of delegation and policymaking in polities where bureaucratic capacity is low. Our analysis suggests that low bureaucratic capacity diminishes incentives for bureaucrats to comply with legislation, making it more difficult for politicians to induce bureaucrats to take actions that politicians desire. Consequently, when bureaucratic capacity is low, standard principles in the theoretical literature on delegation no longer hold. We also use the model to examine the issue of political reform in polities with low bureaucratic capacity. The model indicates that politicians in such polities will be trapped in a situation whereby they have little incentive to undertake reforms of either the bureaucracy or other institutions (such as courts) that are crucial for successful policymaking.

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Metadata

Authors
HUBER, J. D., & McCARTY, N.
Venue
American Political Science Review
Published
2004-08
Volume
98
Issue
3
Pages
481-494
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
OpenAlex
W2140074439
Cited by
352
References
26
FWCI
30.03
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0003055404001297
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HUBER, J. D., & McCARTY, N. (2004). Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055404001297

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.