The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise
Abstract
We investigate how aspects of “civil service” systems of personnel management interact with bureaucratic discretion to create expert bureaucracies populated by policy‐motivated agents. We construct a dynamic model in which bureaucrats may invest in (relationship‐specific) policy expertise and may or may not be interested in policy choices per se. The legislature makes sequentially rational grants of discretion, which serve as incentives for expertise investment and continued service only for policy‐motivated bureaucrats. Bureaucratic policy preferences and the legislature's agency problem vis‐à‐vis bureaucracies develop endogenously in the model. Bureaucratic expertise can be supported in equilibrium only at a cost of its politicization; “neutral competence” is inconsistent with strategic incentives of bureaucrats. We identify several conditions that support the development of an expert bureaucracy in equilibrium, including security of job tenure and control over policy issues for policy‐motivated bureaucrats.
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Bonica, A. (2014) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12062 · Cited by 680
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The Reputational Basis of Public Accountability
Busuioc, E. M., & Lodge, M. (2016) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12161 · Cited by 306
Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gailmard, S., & Patty, J. W.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-10
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 873-889
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W1971247574
- Cited by
- 496
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 31.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Gailmard, S., & Patty, J. W. (2007). Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00286.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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