The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?
Open accessAbstract
A large and growing literature links high levels of ethnic diversity to low levels of public goods provision. Yet although the empirical connection between ethnic heterogeneity and the underprovision of public goods is widely accepted, there is little consensus on the specific mechanisms through which this relationship operates. We identify three families of mechanisms that link diversity to public goods provision—what we term “preferences,” “technology,” and “strategy selection” mechanisms—and run a series of experimental games that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mechanisms within each of these three families. Results from games conducted with a random sample of 300 subjects from a slum neighborhood of Kampala, Uganda, suggest that successful public goods provision in homogenous ethnic communities can be attributed to a strategy selection mechanism: in similar settings, co-ethnics play cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do not. In addition, we find evidence for a technology mechanism: co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus plausibly better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction. We find no evidence for prominent preference mechanisms that emphasize the commonality of tastes within ethnic groups or a greater degree of altruism toward co-ethnics, and only weak evidence for technology mechanisms that focus on the impact of shared ethnicity on the productivity of teams.
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Cites
Collective action and the evolution of social norms.
Ostrom, E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137 · Cited by 4,195
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa
Posner, D. N. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808661 · Cited by 1,113
Self-citation
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Metadata
- Authors
- HABYARIMANA, J., HUMPHREYS, M., POSNER, D. N., & WEINSTEIN, J. M.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2007-11
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 709-725
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2098501785
- Cited by
- 1,319
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 80.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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