The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bribes, Lobbying, and Development
Abstract
When faced with a regulatory constraint, firms can either comply, bribe the regulator to get around the rule, or lobby the government to relax it. We analyze this choice, and its consequences, in a simple dynamic model. In equilibrium, when the level of development is low, firms are more inclined to bend the rule through bribery but they tend to switch to lobbying when the level of development is sufficiently high. Bribery, however, is associated with holdup problems, which discourage firms from investing. If the holdup problems are severe, firms will never invest enough to make lobbying worthwhile. The country may then be stuck in a poverty trap with bribery forever. The model can account for the common perception that bribery is relatively more common in poor countries, whereas lobbying is relatively more common in rich ones.
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Cites
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration
Sachs, J. D., Warner, A., Aslund, A., & Fischer, S. (1995) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.2307/2534573 · Cited by 4,950 · cited 1×
“Ofthecountriesassignedanopennessscorefortheperiod1998– 1999(WacziargandWelch2008)usingtheSachsandWarner(1995)criteria—–acompositeindexoftheregulationoftradewith0 = closed and 1 = open—–the median country in the 10% most corrupt sample is closed to trade, whereas the median country in the full…”
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399436 · Cited by 3,956 · cited 9×
“18 De Soto (1989) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that regulations are partly instituted to provide public officials with the power, or the property rights, to demand and collect bribes. Empirical evidence is provided in Djankov et al. (2002). Country-specific evidence is”
InfluentialBanerjee, A. V. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555484 · Cited by 587
Cited by
Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying
de Figueiredo, J. M., & Richter, B. K. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135308 · Cited by 367
Policy design for the Anthropocene
Sterner, T., Barbier, E. B., Bateman, I., van den Bijgaart, I., Crépin, A.-S., Edenhofer, O., Fischer, C., Habla, W., Hassler, J., Johansson-Stenman, O., et al. (2019) · Nature Sustainability · doi:10.1038/s41893-018-0194-x · Cited by 271
Jia, N. (2014) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2092 · Cited by 272
The Economics of Tropical Deforestation
Balboni, C., Berman, A., Burgess, R., & Olken, B. A. (2023) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-090622-024705 · Cited by 111
Metadata
- Authors
- HARSTAD, B., & SVENSSON, J.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2011-02
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 46-63
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W3122336884
- Cited by
- 195
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 53.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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