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The Incumbency Curse: Weak Parties, Term Limits, and Unfulfilled Accountability
Abstract
We study how representation works in a context where accountability to voters is restricted because of term limits and accountability to parties is limited because of party weakness. Analyzing all Brazilian mayoral elections between 1996 and 2012 using a regression discontinuity design, we show that becoming the incumbent party results in large subsequent electoral losses. We theorize that the presence of term limits, combined with political parties to which politicians are only weakly attached, affects the incentives and behavior of individual politicians in such a way that their parties’ suffer systematic losses. A descriptive analysis of an original dataset on the career paths of Brazilian mayors suggests that our assumptions are an accurate description of Brazil’s political context, and we find support for three central empirical implications of our theoretical explanation. Moreover, based on an analysis of additional data from Mexico, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, and Colombia, we show that the negative effects found in Brazil also exist in other democracies.
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Cites
Regression discontinuity designs in economics
Lee, D. S., & Lemieux, T. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.2.281 · Cited by 4,534
Regression-discontinuity analysis: An alternative to the ex post facto experiment.
Thistlethwaite, D. L., & Campbell, D. T. (1960) · Journal of Educational Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0044319 · Cited by 1,469
Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil
Mainwaring, S. P. (1999) · doi:10.1515/9781503616776 · Cited by 836
A “Selection Model” of Political Representation*
Mansbridge, J. (2009) · Journal of Political Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2009.00337.x · Cited by 563
Kitschelt, H., Hawkins, K. A., Luna, J. P., Rosas, G., & Zechmeister, E. J. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511750311 · Cited by 559
Samuels, D. J., & Shugart, M. S. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511780882 · Cited by 432
Cited by
Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians
Avis, E., Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2018) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/699209 · Cited by 308
Metadata
- Authors
- KLAŠNJA, M., & TITIUNIK, R.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2017-02
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 129-148
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2590043485
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 91.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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