Cited by 565Political Theory and DemocracyGame Theory and Voting SystemsElectoral Systems and Political Participation

A “Selection Model” of Political Representation*

Mansbridge, Jane·2009·Journal of Political Philosophy

Abstract

Citizen demands for more accountability and transparency are implicitly grounded in a model of political representation based primarily on sanctions, in which the interests of the representative (in economic terms, the agent) are presumed to conflict with those of the constituent (in economic terms, the principal). A selection model of political representation, as with a selection model of principal-agent relations more generally, is possible when the principal and agent have similar objectives and the agent is already internally motivated to pursue those objectives. If a potential representative’s intrinsic goals (overall direction and specific policies) are those the constituent desires and if the representative also has a verifiable reputation of being both competent and honest, a constituent can select that representative for office and subsequently spend relatively little effort on monitoring and sanctioning. The higher the probability that the objectives of principal and agent may be aligned, the more efficient it is for the principal to invest resources ex ante, in selecting the required type, rather than ex post, in monitoring and sanctioning. A selection model is efficient when agents face unpredictable future decisions, are hard to monitor, and must act flexibly. Accountability through monitoring and sanctioning is appropriate to the sanctions model, narrative accountability and deliberative accountability to the selection model. Normatively, the selection model tends to focus the attention of both citizens and representatives on the common interest. In political science the selection model was advanced in the early 1960s as one of the two paths to constituency control, but after the 1970s was eclipsed by the sanctions model in spite of data seeming to indicate that in many circumstances it has greater predictive power. Economists have only recently begun to apply the selection model significantly to politics.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1467-9760.2009.00337.x

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Authors
Mansbridge, J.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Mansbridge, Jane
Venue
Journal of Political Philosophy
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2009-10-07
Volume
17
Issue
4
Pages
369-398
ISSN
  • 0963-8016 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9760
OpenAlex
W2159710636
Cited by
563
References
87
Citations by year
2026: 28 · 2025: 36 · 2024: 63 · 2023: 40 · 2022: 39 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 68 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 28 · 2012: 12
FWCI
65.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Political Philosophy (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
Keywords
political representation, selection model, principal-agent relationship, accountability, reputation, representative selection

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