The DOI matches its Crossref record; 71 of the 72 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances
Abstract
A prerequisite for the durability of authoritarian regimes as well as their effective governance is the regime’s ability to gather reliable information about the actions of lower-tier officials. Allowing public participation in the form of online complaints is one approach authoritarian regimes have taken to improve monitoring of lower-tier officials. In this paper, we gain rare access to internal communications between a monitoring agency and upper-level officials in China. We show that citizen grievances posted publicly online that contain complaints of corruption are systematically concealed from upper-level authorities when they implicate lower-tier officials or associates connected to lower-tier officials through patronage ties. Information manipulation occurs primarily through omission of wrongdoing rather than censorship or falsification, suggesting that even in the digital age, in a highly determined and capable regime where reports of corruption are actively and publicly voiced, monitoring the behavior of regime agents remains a challenge.
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“That said, lower-level Chinese officials are often effective at limiting the flow of grassroots grievances to higher officials (88).”
From Physical and virtual repertoires of contention (2022) · cites this paper as [88]
Citations
Cites
How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression
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“In the digital age, these citizen complaints are often posted online where they remain uncensored and publicly accessible (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013).”
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Why Does China Allow Freer Social Media? Protests versus Surveillance and Propaganda
Qin, B., Strömberg, D., & Wu, Y. (2017) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.31.1.117 · Cited by 353
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Self-citationAuthoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China
Weiss, J. C., & Dafoe, A. (2019) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqz059 · Cited by 182
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Capturing Clicks: How the Chinese Government Uses Clickbait to Compete for Visibility
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- PAN, J., & CHEN, K.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Corresponding author
- PAN, JENNIFER
- CHEN, KAIPING
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2018-06-06
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 602-620
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2805967013
- Cited by
- 125
- References
- 72
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 36 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 2
- FWCI
- 33.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Keywords
- citizen complaints, patronage networks, information manipulation, omission, censorship, Chinese officials, citizen participation
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