The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 12 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression
Open accessAbstract
We offer the first large scale, multiple source analysis of the outcome of what may be the most extensive effort to selectively censor human expression ever implemented. To do this, we have devised a system to locate, download, and analyze the content of millions of social media posts originating from nearly 1,400 different social media services all over China before the Chinese government is able to find, evaluate, and censor (i.e., remove from the Internet) the subset they deem objectionable. Using modern computer-assisted text analytic methods that we adapt to and validate in the Chinese language, we compare the substantive content of posts censored to those not censored over time in each of 85 topic areas. Contrary to previous understandings, posts with negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies are not more likely to be censored. Instead, we show that the censorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content. Censorship is oriented toward attempting to forestall collective activities that are occurring now or may occur in the future—and, as such, seem to clearly expose government intent.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper uses large-scale, real-time collection of Chinese social media posts to test why China censors online expression. It finds that censorship does not target criticism of the state or leaders; instead, it targets posts with collective action potential, regardless of whether they support or criticize the government.
Key findings
- Across the data, an average of approximately 13% of all social media posts were censored. Ex ante political sensitivity had only a weak relationship with censorship: Low and Medium categories were censored at 16% and 17%, respectively, versus 24% for High.
- Censorship was much higher during volume bursts tied to collective action: average censorship magnitude was 27% for collective action, compared with -1% for policy and -4% for news.
- For collective action events such as Ai Weiwei’s arrest, Inner Mongolia protests, and Fuzhou bombings, posts were censored at about 80% on average whether they criticized or supported the state. For non-collective-action events such as the one child policy, corruption policy, and food prices, censorship was about 10% on average for both critical and supportive posts.
- Censorship also targeted pornography and criticism of the censors, but not government policy or other news. The authors argue censorship is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization.
Methods
- The authors built a system to locate, download, and analyze posts from 1,382 Chinese websites during the first half of 2011, before government censors could remove them. They collected 3,674,698 posts, randomly selected 127,283 for further analysis, and overall collected and analyzed 11,382,221 posts.
- They used a stratified random sampling design covering 85 topic areas across three hypothesized political sensitivity levels, detected 87 volume bursts in 67 of the 85 topic areas using robust regression-based burst detection, and classified events into collective action potential, criticism of censors, pornography, government policies, and other news.
- To analyze content, they adapted the Hopkins and King “ReadMe” automated text analysis method to Chinese and extended it with a Bayesian procedure to estimate the percent censored within categories. Validation used native Chinese speakers coding 1,000 posts about 2010 labor strikes, with 100 as training and 900 as test; event coding reliability was 98.9% (86 of 87 events).
Limitations
- The paper states that its methodology misses self-censorship and censorship that may occur before the post is obtained; it also does not quantify the direct effects of the Great Firewall, keyword blocking, or search filtering.
- The authors state they have not studied physical violence, such as arrest of bloggers, or threats of the same; although many officials and levels of government influence censorship decisions, their data only sometimes distinguish among these sources, and they cannot determine the consequences of these limitations.
- The authors note that the presumably smaller number of discussions they cannot observe are likely to be those of most interest to the Chinese government, and they offer little evidence connecting social media findings to press freedom or other types of human expression in China. They also state that the predictive analysis was conducted retrospectively and with only three events, so further prospective validation would be valuable.
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Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 7 Not valid · 7 Not checked · 88 Own results and interpretations
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Our data show that the Chinese censorship program allows for a wide variety of criticisms of the Chinese government, its officials, and its policies.”
§ How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression * > Outline of Results
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Contrary to previous understandings, posts with negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies are not more likely to be censored.”
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
“we find that when the Chinese people write scathing criticisms of their government and its leaders, the probability that their post will be censored does not increase.”
§ How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression * > Abstract
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Large increases in online volume are good predictors of censorship when these increases are associated with events related to collective action, e.g., protest on the ground.”
§ How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression * > Outline of Results
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In addition, we measure sentiment within each of these events and show that during these events, the government censors views that are both supportive and critical of the state.”
§ How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression * > Outline of Results
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We thus conduct the same analysis for the demotion of Wang Lijun in Panel (c) of Figure 11, and again see a large difference in actual and predicted percent censorship before Wang's demotion.”
§ How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression * > Additional information
plainSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Authorities are keen to review social media posts and have contentious messages removed (King etal., 2013) to ensure that potential threats remain invisible.”
From How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay (2020) · cites this paper as King et al., 2013
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“In most autocratic regimes, governmental interference in digital infrastructure and communication is commonplace.”
From How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay (2020) · cites this paper as King et al., 2013
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“First, the timing of censorship during a coup is consistent with many studies that have shown that Internet censorship is targeted during sensitive political time periods and periods of potential power transitions, such as elections and large-scale protests [23,25,44,47,73].”
From A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar (2021) · cites this paper as [44]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“research has shown how mobilization organized through public coordination is repressed using that very same public information-for instance, repression is preemptively increased before focal days (Truex 2019); and autocracies censor online calls for collective action (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013), coerce online opinion leaders (Pan and Siegel 2020), and at times, turn off the internet entirely.”
From Coordinated Dis-Coordination (2024) · cites this paper as King, Pan, and Roberts 2013
The check wasn’t confident either way, so it gives no verdict — never disputed.
In the citing paper
“In China, for instance, two virtual police officers remind citizens that their browsing behavior is monitored (King etal., 2013).”
From How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay (2020) · cites this paper as King et al., 2013
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Citations
Cites
Robust estimation of a location parameter
Huber, P. J. (1964) · The Annals of Mathematical Statistics · doi:10.1214/aoms/1177703732 · Cited by 7,228
Robust Regression and Outlier Detection
Piepel, G. F. (1989) · Technometrics · doi:10.1080/00401706.1989.10488524 · Cited by 6,144
Robust Regression and Outlier Detection
Rousseeuw, P. J., & Leroy, A. M. (1987) · Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics · doi:10.1002/0471725382 · Cited by 5,609
Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data
King, G., & Zeng, L. (2001) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a004868 · Cited by 4,316 · cited 1×
“We do this via well-known and widely used case-control methodology (King and Zeng 2001).”
MethodSelf-citationDemocracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
Rightful Resistance in Rural China
O'Brien, K. J., & Li, L. (2006) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791086 · Cited by 1,104
The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91
Lohmann, S. (1994) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2950679 · Cited by 1,035 · cited 1×
“Protests in East Germany, Eastern Europe, and most recently the Middle East have all preceded regime change (Ash 2002; Lohmann 1994; Przeworski et al. 2000).”
BackgroundRightful Resistance in Rural China
O'Brien, K., & Li, L.-J. (2006) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791086.003 · Cited by 987
China's Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience
Nathan, A. J. (2003) · Journal of Democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2003.0019 · Cited by 927
Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution
Kuran, T. (1989) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00116762 · Cited by 905 · cited 1×
“In fact, Kuran (1989) and Lohmann (2002) show that it is information about a collective action event that propels collective action and so distinguishing this from explicit calls for collective action would be difficult if not impossible.”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 15
- Freedom House. 2012. “Freedom of the Press, 2012.” www.freedomhouse.org.
- Chang, 1983, Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China
- Hinton, 1955, The “Unprincipled Dispute” Within Chinese Communist Top Leadership
- Perry, 2002, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China
- Schurmann, 1966, Ideology and Organization in Communist China
- Tsai, 2007, Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China
- Xiao, 2011, Changing Media, Changing China, 202
- Charles, 1966, China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command, 20
- Marolt, 2011, Online Society in China: Creating, Celebrating, and Instrumentalising the Online Carnival, 53
- Shirk, 2007, China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise
- Teiwes, 1979, Politics and Purges in China: Retification and the Decline of Party Norms
- Duan, 2007, China's IT Leadership
- Lindtner, 2011, Online Society in China: Creating, Celebrating, and Instrumentalising the Online Carnival, 89
- MacFarquhar, 1974, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution Volume 1: Contradictions Among the People 1956–1957
- Chen, 2011, Online Society in China: Creating, Celebrating, and Instrumentalising the Online Carnival, 40
Cited by
Tucker, J. A., Guess, A., Barbera, P., Vaccari, C., Siegel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukal, D., & Nyhan, B. (2018) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3144139 · Cited by 1,222
KING, G., PAN, J., & ROBERTS, M. E. (2017) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055417000144 · Cited by 1,028
“Our rules followed the principle articulated in footnote 20 of King et al. (2014) of trying to avoid influencing the system that we were studying, which has the added advantage of reducing the chance for bias.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialSelf-citationSocial Data: Biases, Methodological Pitfalls, and Ethical Boundaries
Olteanu, A., Castillo, C., Diaz, F., & Kiciman, E. (2016) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2886526 · Cited by 763
Social Data: Biases, Methodological Pitfalls, and Ethical Boundaries
Olteanu, A., Castillo, C., Diaz, F., & Kıcıman, E. (2019) · Frontiers in Big Data · doi:10.3389/fdata.2019.00013 · Cited by 763
Computational Grounded Theory: A Methodological Framework
Nelson, L. K. (2020) · Sociological Methods & Research · doi:10.1177/0049124117729703 · Cited by 697
“Other disciplines in the social sciences, including political scientists (Grimmer 2010; King, Pan, and Roberts 2013; Schwartz and Ungar 2015) and psychologists (Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010; Yu and Ho 2014), have already incorporated computational methods into their repertoire, adapting a range of…”
BackgroundMethod
Metadata
- Authors
- KING, G., PAN, J., & ROBERTS, M. E.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- KING, GARY
- PAN, JENNIFER
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2013-05
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 326-343
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2144188763
- Cited by
- 2,415
- References
- 48
- Citations by year
- 2026: 161 · 2025: 206 · 2024: 249 · 2023: 272 · 2022: 230 · 2021: 193 · 2020: 206 · 2019: 157 · 2018: 178 · 2017: 153 · 2016: 137 · 2015: 120 · 2014: 91 · 2013: 54
- FWCI
- 395.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- nrs.harvard.edu
- Licence
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
- Social Sciences › Law › Freedom of Expression and Defamation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- internet censorship, Chinese government, social media, collective action, social mobilization, political criticism, online speech
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