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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 12 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression

Open access
KING, GARY, PAN, JENNIFER, ROBERTS, MARGARET E. · 2013 · American Political Science Review

Abstract

We offer the first large scale, multiple source analysis of the outcome of what may be the most extensive effort to selectively censor human expression ever implemented. To do this, we have devised a system to locate, download, and analyze the content of millions of social media posts originating from nearly 1,400 different social media services all over China before the Chinese government is able to find, evaluate, and censor (i.e., remove from the Internet) the subset they deem objectionable. Using modern computer-assisted text analytic methods that we adapt to and validate in the Chinese language, we compare the substantive content of posts censored to those not censored over time in each of 85 topic areas. Contrary to previous understandings, posts with negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies are not more likely to be censored. Instead, we show that the censorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content. Censorship is oriented toward attempting to forestall collective activities that are occurring now or may occur in the future—and, as such, seem to clearly expose government intent.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper uses large-scale, real-time collection of Chinese social media posts to test why China censors online expression. It finds that censorship does not target criticism of the state or leaders; instead, it targets posts with collective action potential, regardless of whether they support or criticize the government.

Key findings

  • Across the data, an average of approximately 13% of all social media posts were censored. Ex ante political sensitivity had only a weak relationship with censorship: Low and Medium categories were censored at 16% and 17%, respectively, versus 24% for High.
  • Censorship was much higher during volume bursts tied to collective action: average censorship magnitude was 27% for collective action, compared with -1% for policy and -4% for news.
  • For collective action events such as Ai Weiwei’s arrest, Inner Mongolia protests, and Fuzhou bombings, posts were censored at about 80% on average whether they criticized or supported the state. For non-collective-action events such as the one child policy, corruption policy, and food prices, censorship was about 10% on average for both critical and supportive posts.
  • Censorship also targeted pornography and criticism of the censors, but not government policy or other news. The authors argue censorship is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization.

Methods

  • The authors built a system to locate, download, and analyze posts from 1,382 Chinese websites during the first half of 2011, before government censors could remove them. They collected 3,674,698 posts, randomly selected 127,283 for further analysis, and overall collected and analyzed 11,382,221 posts.
  • They used a stratified random sampling design covering 85 topic areas across three hypothesized political sensitivity levels, detected 87 volume bursts in 67 of the 85 topic areas using robust regression-based burst detection, and classified events into collective action potential, criticism of censors, pornography, government policies, and other news.
  • To analyze content, they adapted the Hopkins and King “ReadMe” automated text analysis method to Chinese and extended it with a Bayesian procedure to estimate the percent censored within categories. Validation used native Chinese speakers coding 1,000 posts about 2010 labor strikes, with 100 as training and 900 as test; event coding reliability was 98.9% (86 of 87 events).

Limitations

  • The paper states that its methodology misses self-censorship and censorship that may occur before the post is obtained; it also does not quantify the direct effects of the Great Firewall, keyword blocking, or search filtering.
  • The authors state they have not studied physical violence, such as arrest of bloggers, or threats of the same; although many officials and levels of government influence censorship decisions, their data only sometimes distinguish among these sources, and they cannot determine the consequences of these limitations.
  • The authors note that the presumably smaller number of discussions they cannot observe are likely to be those of most interest to the Chinese government, and they offer little evidence connecting social media findings to press freedom or other types of human expression in China. They also state that the predictive analysis was conducted retrospectively and with only three events, so further prospective validation would be valuable.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/s0003055413000014

Cites

54 of 54 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Image 1
CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 2 The Speed of Censorship, Monitored in Real-Time
Figure 2 The Speed of Censorship, Monitored in Real-TimeCC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 3 'Censorship Magnitude,' the percent of posts censored inside a volume burst minus outside volume bursts.
Figure 3 'Censorship Magnitude,' the percent of posts censored inside a volume burst minus outside volume bursts.CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 4 Events with Highest and Lowest Censorship Magnitude
Figure 4 Events with Highest and Lowest Censorship MagnitudeCC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 5 High Censorship During Collective Action Events (in 2011)
Figure 5 High Censorship During Collective Action Events (in 2011)CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 6 Low Censorship on News and Policy Events (in 2011)
Figure 6 Low Censorship on News and Policy Events (in 2011)CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 7 Two Topics with Continuous High Censorship Levels (in 2011)
Figure 7 Two Topics with Continuous High Censorship Levels (in 2011)CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 8 Content of Censored Posts
Figure 8 Content of Censored PostsCC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 9 Content of Censored Posts
Figure 9 Content of Censored PostsCC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 10 Validation of Automated Text Analysis
Figure 10 Validation of Automated Text AnalysisCC-BY · From the PDF
Image 11
CC-BY · From the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

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Citations

Cites

Show all 48 references

Research works printed but not linked: 15

  1. Freedom House. 2012. “Freedom of the Press, 2012.” www.freedomhouse.org.
  2. Chang, 1983, Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China
  3. Hinton, 1955, The “Unprincipled Dispute” Within Chinese Communist Top Leadership
  4. Perry, 2002, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China
  5. Schurmann, 1966, Ideology and Organization in Communist China
  6. Tsai, 2007, Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China
  7. Xiao, 2011, Changing Media, Changing China, 202
  8. Charles, 1966, China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command, 20
  9. Marolt, 2011, Online Society in China: Creating, Celebrating, and Instrumentalising the Online Carnival, 53
  10. Shirk, 2007, China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise
  11. Teiwes, 1979, Politics and Purges in China: Retification and the Decline of Party Norms
  12. Duan, 2007, China's IT Leadership
  13. Lindtner, 2011, Online Society in China: Creating, Celebrating, and Instrumentalising the Online Carnival, 89
  14. MacFarquhar, 1974, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution Volume 1: Contradictions Among the People 1956–1957
  15. Chen, 2011, Online Society in China: Creating, Celebrating, and Instrumentalising the Online Carnival, 40

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
KING, G., PAN, J., & ROBERTS, M. E.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
  • KING, GARY
  • PAN, JENNIFER
Venue
American Political Science Review
Published
2013-05
Volume
107
Issue
2
Pages
326-343
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
OpenAlex
W2144188763
Cited by
2,415
References
48
Citations by year
2026: 161 · 2025: 206 · 2024: 249 · 2023: 272 · 2022: 230 · 2021: 193 · 2020: 206 · 2019: 157 · 2018: 178 · 2017: 153 · 2016: 137 · 2015: 120 · 2014: 91 · 2013: 54
FWCI
395.09
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Freedom of Expression and Defamation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
Keywords
internet censorship, Chinese government, social media, collective action, social mobilization, political criticism, online speech

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0003055413000014
The paper
KING, G., PAN, J., & ROBERTS, M. E. (2013). How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055413000014

Data sources

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.