Your Place or Mine? Institutional Capture and the Creation of Overlapping International Institutions
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Why do states create overlapping international institutions? This practice presents a puzzle: conventional wisdom suggests that states should use existing institutions to minimize the transaction costs of co-operation. This article proposes a bargaining approach to explain the de novo creation of overlapping international institutions. In this model, a dissatisfied ‘challenger’ state threatens to create a new institution, and a ‘defender’ state can propose to reform the currently focal institution. Overlapping institutions are created when the currently focal institution is (1) captured by interests opposed to the challenger and (2) domestic political pressure to abandon the status quo is intense. Similar to models of deterrence, the expectation that the new institution garners support among third parties is irrelevant for the equilibrium likelihood of de novo creation. A comparative analysis of international bargaining over energy, whaling and intellectual property rights provides empirical evidence.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.
Tullock, G., & Hirschman, A. O. (1970) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2325604 · Cited by 10,904
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 1×
“31 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.”
Rationalist explanations for war
Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995 · cited 2×
“32 Fearon 1995. reduction of agricultural subsidies in Europe and North America, the EU and the United States may suspect that the developing countries are not really willing to create alternative trade institutions to challenge the WTO.”
BackgroundThe Regime Complex for Climate Change
Keohane, R. O., & Victor, D. G. (2011) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592710004068 · Cited by 2,047
Caron, D. D. (1995) · American Journal of International Law · doi:10.2307/2203905 · Cited by 48
Cited by
The Rise of International Regime Complexity
Alter, K. J., & Raustiala, K. (2018) · Annual Review of Law and Social Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-101317-030830 · Cited by 409
Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes
Pratt, T. (2018) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818318000164 · Cited by 192
The International Trade Regime and the Quest for Free Digital Trade
Azmeh, S., Foster, C., & Echavarri, J. (2020) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1093/isr/viz033 · Cited by 164
Becker, M. (2019) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/rego.12250 · Cited by 71
Metadata
- Authors
- Urpelainen, J., & Van de Graaf, T.
- Venue
- British Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2014-03-27
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 799-827
- ISSN
- 0007-1234 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-2112
- OpenAlex
- W2159799103
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 23.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Your Place or Mine? Institutional Capture and the Creation of Overlapping International Institutions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0007123413000537
- The paper
- Urpelainen, J., & Van de Graaf, T. (2015). Your Place or Mine? Institutional Capture and the Creation of Overlapping International Institutions. British Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123413000537
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.