The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance
Abstract
Whether a treaty elicits compliance from governments or nonstate actors depends upon identifiable characteristics of the regime's compliance systems. Within the international regime controlling intentional oil pollution, a provision requiring tanker owners to install specified equipment produced dramatically higher levels of compliance than a provision requiring tanker operators to limit their discharges. Since both provisions entailed strong economic incentives for violation and regulated the same countries over the same time period, the variance in compliance clearly can be attributed to different features of the two subregimes. The equipment requirements' success stemmed from establishing an integrated compliance system that increased transparency, provided for potent and credible sanctions, reduced implementation costs to governments by building on existing infrastructures, and prevented violations rather than merely deterring them.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Mitchell, R. B.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1994
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 425-458
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W1964584173
- Cited by
- 357
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 24.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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