The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The politics of international regime formation: managing natural resources and the environment
Abstract
Why do actors in international society succeed in forming institutional arrangements or regimes to cope with some transboundary problems but fail to do so in connection with other, seemingly similar, problems? This article employs a threefold strategy to make progress toward answering this question. The first section prepares the ground by identifying and critiquing the principal models embedded in the existing literature on regime formation, and the second section articulates an alternative model, called institutional bargaining. The third section employs this alternative model to derive some hypotheses about the determinants of success in institutional bargaining and uses these hypotheses, in a preliminary way, to illuminate the process of regime formation in international society. To lend empirical content to the argument, the article focuses throughout on problems relating to natural resources and the environment.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 11,816
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition
Rawls, J. (1971) · doi:10.4159/9780674042605 · Cited by 9,496
Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games
Putnam, R. D. (1988) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027697 · Cited by 7,475
After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
Diebold, W., & Keohane, R. O. (1984) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20042201 · Cited by 3,944
Connolly, T., & Axelrod, R. (1984) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392957 · Cited by 3,890
(2015) · Adversarial Risk Analysis · doi:10.1201/b18653-3 · Cited by 3,632
The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy
Buchanan, J., & Tullock, G. (1960) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.7687 · Cited by 3,595
The Political Economy of International Relations
Gilpin, R. (1987) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400882779 · Cited by 2,583
The Art and Science of Negotiation.
Hey, J. D., & Raiffa, H. (1984) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554559 · Cited by 2,453
Jones, R. J. B. (1983) · International Affairs · doi:10.2307/2618936 · Cited by 2,359
The Theory of Political Coalitions
Brazil, B. R., & Riker, W. S. (1963) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/445870 · Cited by 2,106
Riker, W. H., Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2108773 · Cited by 2,059
The Theory of Political Coalitions.
Hotz, A. J., & Riker, W. H. (1963) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109034 · Cited by 1,528
After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
Merrifeld, C. (1985) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.1985.11504402 · Cited by 1,506
The rise and fall of the great powers
Kennedy, P. (1988) · Business Horizons · doi:10.1016/0007-6813(88)90030-4 · Cited by 1,366
Hardin, R. (1982) · doi:10.56021/9780801828188 · Cited by 1,230
Oye, K. A. (1986) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691186702 · Cited by 1,131
(1973) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,086
The limits of hegemonic stability theory
Snidal, D. (1985) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s002081830002703x · Cited by 839
The Art and Science of Negotiation
Young, H. P., & Raiffa, H. (1983) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.2307/3324050 · Cited by 728
Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism
Diebold, W., & Krasner, S. D. (1985) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20042598 · Cited by 711
The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy.
Broome, J., Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1988) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554477 · Cited by 698
The Persistent myth of lost hegemony
Strange, S. (1987) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027600 · Cited by 580
International cooperation: building regimes for natural resources and the environment
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-2342 · Cited by 531
Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes
Snidal, D. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956241 · Cited by 491
Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties
Sebenius, J. K. (1983) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s002081830003438x · Cited by 489
Political Leadership and Collective Goods
Davis, D. H., Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J. A., & Young, O. R. (1971) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/446952 · Cited by 452
Self-citationInternational Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment
Young, O. R. (1989) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/9781501738128 · Cited by 383
Self-citationLeebaert, D., Zartman, I. W., & Berman, M. R. (1983) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.2307/3323311 · Cited by 325
The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977
Keohane, R. O. (2019) · Change in the International System · doi:10.4324/9780429052187-6 · Cited by 293
The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy.
Sudgen, R., Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1987) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233360 · Cited by 268
Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas.
Lieberman, B., & Rapoport, A. (1967) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091730 · Cited by 232
Three approaches to the measurement of power in international relations
Hart, J. (1976) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300018282 · Cited by 206
Interdependencies in World Politics
Young, O. R. (1969) · International Journal Canada s Journal of Global Policy Analysis · doi:10.1177/002070206902400407 · Cited by 68
Self-citationCollective Decision-Making. Applications from Public Choice Theory.
Grand, J. L., & Russell, C. S. (1981) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2553710 · Cited by 61
Hierarchy versus inertial cooperation
Kindleberger, C. P. (1986) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027399 · Cited by 56
Small, G. L. (1971) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 52
Maoz, Z., & Felsenthal, D. S. (1987) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2600452 · Cited by 38
Natural Resources and the State
Young, O. R. (1981) · University of California Press eBooks · doi:10.1525/9780520333260 · Cited by 33
Self-citation
Cited by
Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research program
Adler, E., & Haas, P. M. (1992) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300001533 · Cited by 1,037
Global Prohibition Regimes: the Evolution of Norms in International Society
Nadelmann, E. A. (1990) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300035384 · Cited by 989
Young, O. R. (1991) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033117 · Cited by 779
Self-citationThe Structuring of a World Environmental Regime, 1870–1990
Meyer, J. W., Frank, D. J., Hironaka, A., Schofer, E., & Tuma, N. B. (1997) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081897550474 · Cited by 580
A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation
Moravcsik, A. (1999) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081899550887 · Cited by 517
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, O. R.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1989
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 349-375
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2098151949
- Cited by
- 461
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 111.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.