Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime Complexes
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
How do states resolve jurisdictional conflicts among international institutions? In many issue areas, global governance is increasingly fragmented among multiple international organizations (IOs). Existing work argues this fragmentation can undermine cooperation as different institutions adopt conflicting rules. However, this perspective overlooks the potential for interinstitutional coordination. I develop a theory of institutional deference: the acceptance of another IO's exercise of authority. By accepting rules crafted in another IO, member states can mitigate rule conflict and facilitate a division of labor within the regime complex. I use an original data set of over 2,000 IO policy documents to describe patterns of deference in the counterterrorism, intellectual property, and election-monitoring regime complexes. Empirical tests support two theoretical claims. First, institutional deference is indeed associated with a division of labor among institutions: IOs that defer to each other are more likely to focus their rule-making efforts on separate subissues. Second, deference is a strategic act that is shaped both by efficiency concerns and power politics. Statistical tests confirm that deference is used to efficiently pool resources among disparate organizations, and that IOs with weaker member states tend to defer to organizations with more powerful members.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Blei, D. M. (2012) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/2133806.2133826 · Cited by 5,516 · cited 2×
“See Blei [2012] for an introduction to topic modeling methodology and an overview of existing models.”
BackgroundMethodAfter Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
Diebold, W., & Keohane, R. O. (1984) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20042201 · Cited by 3,944 · cited 1×
“Keohane 1984.”
The Rational Design of International Institutions
Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081801317193592 · Cited by 2,358
The Regime Complex for Climate Change
Keohane, R. O., & Victor, D. G. (2011) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592710004068 · Cited by 2,047
Structural Topic Models for Open‐Ended Survey Responses
Roberts, M. E., Stewart, B. M., Tingley, D., Lucas, C., Leder‐Luis, J., Gadarian, S. K., Albertson, B., & Rand, D. G. (2014) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12103 · Cited by 1,952 · cited 4×
“See Roberts et al. 2014.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialAfter hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy
Buzan, B. (1985) · International Affairs · doi:10.2307/2617490 · Cited by 1,800
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?
Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N. (1996) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033427 · Cited by 1,540 · cited 1×
“As Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996 have argued, even if a single universal institution were feasible it would necessarily lack the “depth” of a more exclusive cooperative arrangement.”
BackgroundThe Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources
Raustiala, K., & Victor, D. G. (2004) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818304582036 · Cited by 1,417 · cited 2×
“Raustiala and Victor 2004.”
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
(2006) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491368 · Cited by 1,273
The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions
Buchanan, A., & Keohane, R. O. (2006) · Ethics & International Affairs · doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00043.x · Cited by 1,240
The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis
Biermann, F., Pattberg, P., van Asselt, H., & Zelli, F. (2009) · Global Environmental Politics · doi:10.1162/glep.2009.9.4.14 · Cited by 1,189 · cited 3×
“Notable exceptions include Biermann et al. [2009]’s study of “inter-organizational networking” and Gehring and Faude [2014]’s examination of institutional division of labor.”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Politics of International Regime Complexity
Alter, K. J., & Meunier, S. (2009) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592709090033 · Cited by 1,012 · cited 3×
“See Alter and Meunier 2009 and Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013 for overviews of academic treatments of these problems, and Rosand 2006 for a policymaker’s perspective.”
BackgroundGlobal Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier
Krasner, S. D. (1991) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010398 · Cited by 901 · cited 3×
“4Morse [2017]. The FATF maintains a small permanent sta↵ and relies on Secretariat of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for much of its administrative and budgetary work (see http://www.”
BackgroundThe World Intellectual Property Organization
(2012) · International Organizations in WTO Dispute Settlement · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139235969.011 · Cited by 884
International Organizations as Orchestrators
(2015) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139979696 · Cited by 786 · cited 7×
“In describing orchestration, Abbott et al. [2015] state that “by attaching conditions to their support, IGOs can bring (or keep) intermediaries’ governance goals in line with the IGOs’ own goals. Thus, IGO support both empowers intermediaries and enhances IGOs’ ability to steer them (14, emphasis added). 35See Gehring…”
BackgroundInfluentialMorse, J. C., & Keohane, R. O. (2014) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-014-9188-2 · Cited by 637 · cited 2×
“See Helfer [2004], Raustiala [2006], and Morse and Keohane [2014], respectively, for a discussion of forum shopping, regime-shifting, and contested multilateralism.”
BackgroundDelegation and pooling in international organizations
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2015) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-014-9194-4 · Cited by 469
Controlling institutions: international organizations and the global economy
(2012) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.49-3518 · Cited by 412
Regime Complexes: A Buzz, a Boom, or a Boost for Global Governance?
Orsini, A., Morin, J.-F., & Young, O. (2013) · Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations · doi:10.1163/19426720-01901003 · Cited by 410 · cited 1×
“See Alter and Meunier 2009 and Orsini, Morin, and Young 2013 for overviews of academic treatments of these problems, and Rosand 2006 for a policymaker’s perspective.”
BackgroundThe Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity
Drezner, D. W. (2009) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592709090100 · Cited by 371 · cited 1×
“This implication is consistent with work by Benvenisti and Downs 2007 and Drezner 2009, who argue that powerful states stand to benefit the most from the fragmentation of rule-making bodies.”
ResultHelfer, L. R. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.459740 · Cited by 360 · cited 3×
“Helfer 2004, 2009.”
BackgroundThe Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Monitoring Became an International Norm
Hyde, S. D. (2011) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/cornell/9780801449666.001.0001 · Cited by 342
Gehring, T., & Faude, B. (2014) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-014-9197-1 · Cited by 315 · cited 3×
“See Gehring and Faude 2014 for additional discussion on the tradeoff between states’ general interest in coordinated governance and parochial interest in ensuring their specific preferences prevail.”
BackgroundThe Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law
Benveniśtî, E., & Downs, G. W. (2007) · Stanford Law Review · Cited by 296
Helfer, L. R. (2004) · bepress Legal Repository · Cited by 226
Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails
Kelley, J. G. (2012) · doi:10.23943/princeton/9780691152776.001.0001 · Cited by 222
Regime Shifting in the International Intellectual Property System
Helfer, L. R. (2009) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592709090069 · Cited by 222 · cited 2×
“Helfer 2004, 2009.”
Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting
(1998) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/9781501733123 · Cited by 206
The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm
Hyde, S. (2021) · OAPEN (The OAPEN Foundation) · doi:10.7298/bvg9-0151 · Cited by 192
Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails
Kelley, J. G. (2012) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400842520 · Cited by 169
Your Place or Mine? Institutional Capture and the Creation of Overlapping International Institutions
Urpelainen, J., & Van de Graaf, T. (2015) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123413000537 · Cited by 163
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37sup-622 · Cited by 161
Institutional designs for a complex world : bargaining, linkages, and nesting
Aggarwal, V. K. (1998) · Cited by 156
The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring Organizations
Kelley, J. G. (2009) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592709090094 · Cited by 123 · cited 1×
“Kelley 2009, 2012.”
Deciding to Defer: The Importance of Fairness in Resolving Transnational Jurisdictional Conflicts
Efrat, A., & Newman, A. L. (2016) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818316000023 · Cited by 62
Papke (1996) · doi:10.1002/(sici)1099-1255(199611)11:6<619::aid-jae418>3.0.co;2-1 · cited 3×
“12 States may also leverage inconsistencies to escape compliance with burdensome requirements — for example, by exploiting 8Raustiala and Victor [2004] 9Raustiala and Victor [2004, 279] 10The literature on international regime complexity is abundant with examples of conflicting rules: Raustiala and Victor describe “le…”
BackgroundMethodInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Pratt, T.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2018
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 561-590
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2800509790
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 78.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.