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Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650–1913
Open accessAbstract
Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning points in revenue series and political transformations.
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Johnson, N. D., & Koyama, M. (2017) · Explorations in Economic History · doi:10.1016/j.eeh.2016.11.002 · Cited by 375
When Distance Mattered: Geographic Scale and the Development of European Representative Assemblies
STASAVAGE, D. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000444 · Cited by 201
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Karaman, K. K., & Pamuk, Ş. (2010) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050710000550 · Cited by 144
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dincecco, M.
- Venue
- The Journal of Economic History
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2009-03
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 48-103
- ISSN
- 0022-0507 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-6372
- OpenAlex
- W3122941960
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 133
- FWCI
- 34.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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