Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 305

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 82 of the 82 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and the Effect of Shareholder Rights on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital

Open access
Chen, Kevin C. W., Chen, Zhihong, Wei, K. C. John·2011·Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity and the impact of agency problems from free cash flow (FCF) on this effect. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights have a significantly lower implied cost of equity after controlling for risk factors, price momentum, analysts’ forecast biases, and industry and year effects than do firms with weak shareholder rights. Further analysis shows that the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity is significantly stronger for firms with more severe agency problems from FCFs.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/s0022109010000591

Cites

82 of 82 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 82 references

Cited by

See all 305

Metadata

Authors
Chen, K. C. W., Chen, Z., & Wei, K. C. J.
Venue
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Published
2010-09-17
Volume
46
Issue
1
Pages
171-207
ISSN
  • 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
  • 1756-6916
OpenAlex
W2144275088
Cited by
305
References
82
FWCI
43.89
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and the Effect of Shareholder Rights on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0022109010000591
The paper
Chen, K. C. W., Chen, Z., & Wei, K. C. J. (2011). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and the Effect of Shareholder Rights on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109010000591

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.