The DOI matches its Crossref record; 58 of the 58 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment
Abstract
There is a renewed interest in how political risk affects multinational corporations operating in emerging markets. Much of this research has focused on the relationship between democratic institutions and flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Yet the existing studies suffer from data problems that only allow for indirect evidence of the relationship between political institutions and political risk. In this paper I utilize price data from political risk insurance agencies to directly test how domestic political institutions affect the premiums multinationals pay for coverage against government expropriations and contract disputes. I find that democratic regimes reduce risks for multinational investors, specifically through increasing constraints on the executive. Utilizing qualitative evidence from investors, insurers, and location consultants, I explore the mechanisms linking democratic regimes with lower levels of political risk.
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Cites
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Cited by
The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime
Bonnitcha, J., Skovgaard Poulsen, L. N., & Waibel, M. (2017) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/law/9780198719540.001.0001 · Cited by 345
The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Monitoring Became an International Norm
Hyde, S. D. (2011) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/cornell/9780801449666.001.0001 · Cited by 342
Xie, E., Reddy, K. S., & Liang, J. (2017) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2016.12.005 · Cited by 312
The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction
Flores, T. E., & Nooruddin, I. (2012) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381611001733 · Cited by 269
The Effect of Sanctions on U.S. Foreign Direct Investment
Biglaiser, G., & Lektzian, D. (2011) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818311000117 · Cited by 128
Metadata
- Authors
- Jensen, N.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2008-10
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1040-1052
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2121994437
- Cited by
- 533
- References
- 58
- FWCI
- 21.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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