Party Strength and Economic Growth
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
While a large literature suggests an important role for political parties in development, this article is the first attempt to layout and test a comprehensive theory connecting parties to economic growth. The authors argue that strong parties broaden the constituencies to which policymakers respond and help politicians solve coordination problems. These features help to ensure better economic management, public services, and political stability. And this, in turn, enhances economic growth. Drawing on a novel measure of party strength from the Varieties of Democracy data set, the authors test this theory on data drawn from more than 150 countries observed annually from 1901–2010. They identify a sizeable effect that is robust to various specifications, estimators, and samples. The effect operates in both democracies and autocracies, and is fairly stable across regions and time periods.
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Cites
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Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4076(98)00009-8 · Cited by 22,571
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Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1995) · Working Paper Series · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.1995.9517 · Cited by 14,755
The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1369 · Cited by 8,517
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/b:joeg.0000031425.72248.85 · Cited by 5,423
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization
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The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 1×
“But this is expensive when leaders try to cater to different constituencies, as will often be the case in countries led by strong parties, inducing politicians to instead prioritize public goods spending. see Bueno de mesquita et al. 2003.”
Background
Cited by
The Middle-Income Trap: More Politics than Economics
Doner, R. F., & Schneider, B. R. (2016) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887116000095 · Cited by 286
Inclusionary regimes, party institutionalization and redistribution under authoritarianism
Pelke, L. (2020) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1786683 · Cited by 19
Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity
Panaro, A. V., & Vaccaro, A. (2023) · Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica · doi:10.1017/ipo.2022.17 · Cited by 7
“Scholars demonstrate that elections, legislatures, and party competition influence regime survival (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Svolik, 2012) and economic policies, with ramification to investments and economic growth (Gandhi, 2008; Wright, 2008; Bizzarro et al ., 2018).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Bizzarro, F., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Hicken, A., Bernhard, M., Skaaning, S.-E., Coppedge, M., & Lindberg, S. I.
- Venue
- World Politics
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 2018-03-06
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 275-320
- ISSN
- 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3338
- OpenAlex
- W3121348561
- Cited by
- 177
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 49.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Party Strength and Economic Growth. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0043887117000375
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- Bizzarro, F., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Hicken, A., Bernhard, M., Skaaning, S.-E., Coppedge, M., & Lindberg, S. I. (2018). Party Strength and Economic Growth. World Politics. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887117000375
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.