The DOI matches its Crossref record; 181 of the 181 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Précis of Simple heuristics that make us smart
Open accessAbstract
How can anyone be rational in a world where knowledge is limited, time is pressing, and deep thought is often an unattainable luxury? Traditional models of unbounded rationality and optimization in cognitive science, economics, and animal behavior have tended to view decision-makers as possessing supernatural powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and endless time. But understanding decisions in the real world requires a more psychologically plausible notion of bounded rationality. In Simple heuristics that make us smart (Gigerenzer et al. 1999), we explore fast and frugal heuristics – simple rules in the mind's adaptive toolbox for making decisions with realistic mental resources. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices quickly and with a minimum of information by exploiting the way that information is structured in particular environments. In this précis, we show how simple building blocks that control information search, stop search, and make decisions can be put together to form classes of heuristics, including: ignorance-based and one-reason decision making for choice, elimination models for categorization, and satisficing heuristics for sequential search. These simple heuristics perform comparably to more complex algorithms, particularly when generalizing to new data – that is, simplicity leads to robustness. We present evidence regarding when people use simple heuristics and describe the challenges to be addressed by this research program.
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Cited by
Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic.
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.1.75 · Cited by 1,352
Self-citationGigerenzer, G. (2004) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.033 · Cited by 890
Self-citationExperimental practices in economics: A challenge for psychologists?: (683322011-032)
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Trust and Risk Perception: A Critical Review of the Literature
Siegrist, M. (2021) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/risa.13325 · Cited by 606
Dual Processing in Reasoning: Two Systems but One Reasoner
Neys, W. D. (2006) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01723.x · Cited by 536
Metadata
- Authors
- Todd, P. M., & Gigerenzer, G.
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2000-10
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 727-741
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2135477755
- Cited by
- 713
- References
- 181
- FWCI
- 4.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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