Artificial Moral Responsibility: How We Can and Cannot Hold Machines Responsible
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Our ability to locate moral responsibility is often thought to be a necessary condition for conducting morally permissible medical practice, engaging in a just war, and other high-stakes endeavors. Yet, with increasing reliance upon artificially intelligent systems, we may be facing a widening responsibility gap, which, some argue, cannot be bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility. How then, if at all, can we make use of crucial emerging technologies? According to Colin Allen and Wendell Wallach, the advent of so-called ‘artificial moral agents’ (AMAs) is inevitable. Still, this notion may seem to push back the problem, leaving those who have an interest in developing autonomous technology with a dilemma. We may need to scale-back our efforts at deploying AMAs (or at least maintain human oversight); otherwise, we must rapidly and drastically update our moral and legal norms in a way that ensures responsibility for potentially avoidable harms. This paper invokes contemporary accounts of responsibility in order to show how artificially intelligent systems might be held responsible. Although many theorists are concerned enough to develop artificial conceptions of agency or to exploit our present inability to regulate valuable innovations, the proposal here highlights the importance of—and outlines a plausible foundation for—a workable notion of artificial moral responsibility.
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Cites
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Cited by
Responsible AI and moral responsibility: a common appreciation
Tigard, D. W. (2021) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-020-00009-0 · Cited by 56
Self-citationA way forward for responsibility in the age of AI
Gogoshin, D. L. (2025) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2024.2312455 · Cited by 9
Artificial moral agents: should machines take ethical responsibility?
Reiter, P., Norman, U., Weinberger, N., & Bruno, B. (2025) · 2025 IEEE International Conference on Advanced Robotics and its Social Impacts (ARSO) · doi:10.1109/arso64737.2025.11124921 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Tigard, D. W.
- Venue
- Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2021-06-10
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 435-447
- ISSN
- 0963-1801 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-2147
- OpenAlex
- W3173032389
- Cited by
- 57
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 9.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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