The DOI matches its Crossref record; 87 of the 87 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability
Abstract
We explore the sources of durability of party-based authoritarian regimes in the face of crisis. Recent scholarship on authoritarianism suggests that ruling parties enhance elite cohesion—and consequently, regime durability—by providing institutionalized access the spoils of power. We argue, by contrast, that while elite access to power and spoils may ensure elite cooperation during normal times, it often fails to do so during crises. Instead, the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict are a critical source of cohesion—and durability—in party-based authoritarian regimes. Origins in violent conflict raise the cost of defection and provide leaders with additional (non-material) resources that can be critical to maintaining unity and discipline, even when a crisis threatens the party's hold on power. Hence, where ruling parties combine mechanisms of patronage distribution with the strong identities, solidarity ties, and discipline generated by violent origins, regimes should be most durable. We apply this argument to four party-based competitive authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa: Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In each of these cases, an established single- or dominant-party regime faced heightened international pressure, economic crisis, and a strong opposition challenge after 1990. Yet whereas ruling parties in Kenya and Zambia were organized almost exclusively around patronage, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe were liberation parties that came to power via violent struggle. This difference is critical to explaining diverging post-Cold War regime outcomes: whereas ruling parties in Zambia and Kenya imploded and eventually lost power in these face of crises, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe remained intact and regimes survived.
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BackgroundInfluentialCompetitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511781353 · Cited by 3,459
Self-citationThe Logic of Violence in Civil War
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When Do Institutions “Bite”? Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of Institutional Change
Capoccia, G. (2016) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414015626449 · Cited by 340
The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2013) · Journal of Democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2013.0043 · Cited by 302
Self-citationConstraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Meng, A. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108877497 · Cited by 215
Religious Politics in Turkey: From the Birth of the Republic to the AKP
Lord, C. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108638906 · Cited by 174
The origins of policing institutions
Eck, K. (2018) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343317747955 · Cited by 34
Metadata
- Authors
- Levitsky, S. R., & Way, L. A.
- Venue
- Perspectives on Politics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2012-12
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 869-889
- ISSN
- 1537-5927 (ISSN-L)
- 1541-0986
- OpenAlex
- W2041733759
- Cited by
- 415
- References
- 87
- FWCI
- 30.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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