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Cited by 2,611Political Conflict and GovernancePolitical Theory and DemocracyInternational Relations and Foreign Policy

The Politics of Authoritarian Rule

Svolik, Milan W.·2012·Cambridge University Press eBooks
DOI 10.1017/cbo9781139176040
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Abstract

What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule - the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule - the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.

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Crossref · 10.1017/cbo9781139176040

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308 of 308 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • A rapid turnover of the incumbent elite on coming to power is rarely feasible, and any large-scale coordinated attack on the elite would likely provoke immediate resistance.

    “While it might be theoretically desirable to impose a rapid turnover of the incumbent elite on coming to power, this strategy is rarely feasible. Any large-scale coordinated attack on the elite would likely provoke immediate resistance”

    From Post-Populism: Transitions from Populist to Personalist Authoritarian Rule (2023) · cites this paper as Svolik, 2012

  • A large literature on authoritarian politics shows the centrality of information control and propaganda for authoritarian rule.

    “Although not considered by Earl’s typology (19), a large literature on authoritarian politics shows the centrality of information control and propaganda for authoritarian rule (106–111).”

    From Physical and virtual repertoires of contention (2022) · cites this paper as [108]

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Authors
Svolik, M. W.
Affiliations
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (US)
Corresponding author
Svolik, Milan W.
ORCID
Svolik, Milan W.
Venue
Cambridge University Press eBooks
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Published
2012-09-17
DOI
10.1017/cbo9781139176040
OpenAlex
W296931085
Cited by
2,611
References
308
Citations by year
2026: 184 · 2025: 266 · 2024: 195 · 2023: 233 · 2022: 264 · 2021: 184 · 2020: 324 · 2019: 259 · 2018: 226 · 2017: 140 · 2016: 123 · 2015: 99 · 2014: 68 · 2013: 31 · 2012: 9
FWCI
71.77
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 49 d)
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
Keywords
authoritarian regimes, dictatorship, authoritarian control, regime change, military dictatorship, democratic transition, Arab Spring, ruling coalition, political institutions, elite politics

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