The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia
Abstract
Authoritarian ruling parties are expected to be exceptionally resistant to democratization. Yet some of the strongest authoritarian parties in the world have not resisted democratization, but have embraced it. This is because their raison d'etre is to continue ruling, not necessarily to remain authoritarian. Democratization requires that ruling parties hold free and fair elections, but not that they lose them. Authoritarian ruling parties can thus be incentivized to concede democratization from a position of exceptional strength as well as extreme weakness. This “conceding-to-thrive” scenario is most likely to unfold when regimes (1) possess substantial antecedent political strengths and resource advantages, (2) suffer ominous setbacks signaling that they have passed their apex of domination, and (3) pursue new legitimation strategies to arrest their incipient decline. We illustrate this heretofore neglected alternative democratization pathway through a comparative-historical analysis of three Asian developmental states where ruling parties have democratized from varying positions of considerable strength: Taiwan, South Korea, and Indonesia. We then consider the implications of our analysis for three “candidate cases” in developmental Asia where ruling parties have not yet conceded democratization despite being well-positioned to thrive were they to do so: Singapore, Malaysia, and the world's most populous dictatorship, China.
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Citations
Cites
Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization
Wade, R. (1990) · doi:10.1515/9780691187181 · Cited by 4,835
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511781353 · Cited by 3,459
What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
Geddes, B. (1999) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115 · Cited by 2,025
Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization
Brownlee, J. (2007) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511802348 · Cited by 1,070 · cited 1×
“5 Levitsky and Way 2010; Smith 2007; Brownlee 2007; and Slater 2010.”
BackgroundSkeletons in the Closet: Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Europe
Nalepa, M. (2010) · Cambridge University Press · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815362 · Cited by 222 · cited 1×
“13 On how immunity considerations shape democratic transitions and their aftermath, see Nalepa 2010.”
Background
Cited by
Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa
Riedl, R. B. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107045484 · Cited by 424
How State Capacity Helps Autocrats win Elections
Seeberg, M. B. (2021) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123419000450 · Cited by 43
Metadata
- Authors
- Slater, D., & Wong, J.
- Venue
- Perspectives on Politics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2013-09
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 717-733
- ISSN
- 1537-5927 (ISSN-L)
- 1541-0986
- OpenAlex
- W2104730993
- Cited by
- 223
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 20.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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