Beyond “fake news”: Analytic thinking and the detection of false and hyperpartisan news headlines
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Why is misleading partisan content believed and shared? An influential account posits that political partisanship pervasively biases reasoning, such that engaging in analytic thinking exacerbates motivated reasoning and, in turn, the acceptance of hyperpartisan content. Alternatively, it may be that susceptibility to hyperpartisan content is explained by a lack of reasoning. Across two studies using different participant pools (total N = 1,973 Americans), we had participants assess true, false, and hyperpartisan news headlines taken from social media. We found no evidence that analytic thinking was associated with judging politically consistent hyperpartisan or false headlines to be accurate and unbiased. Instead, analytic thinking was, in most cases, associated with an increased tendency to distinguish true headlines from both false and hyperpartisan headlines (and was never associated with decreased discernment). These results suggest that reasoning typically helps people differentiate between low and high quality political news, rather than facilitate belief in misleading content. Because social media play an important role in the dissemination of misinformation, we also investigated willingness to share headlines on social media. We found a similar pattern whereby analytic thinking was not generally associated with increased willingness to share hyperpartisan or false headlines. Together, these results suggest a positive role for reasoning in resisting misinformation.
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Citations
Cites
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Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
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“…2019; Guess, Nyhan & Reifler, 2020), false content is likely to have an impact on individual beliefs (Guess, Lockett, et al., 2020) — for example, the “Pizzagate” incident (Hsu, 2017, June 13) or false beliefs about Donald Trump winning the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election (Pennycook & Rand, 2021a).”
InfluentialSelf-citation
Cited by
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2021) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2021.02.007 · Cited by 1,360
“Furthermore, analytic thinking is not only associated with more truth discernment, as described earlier, but is also associated with having more discerning sharing intentions in survey experiments (both in terms of false [35,44] and hyperpartisan content [35]) and with the actual sharing of more reliable news outlets…”
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Self-citation(2021) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/ar96c · Cited by 12
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ross, R. M., Rand, D. G., & Pennycook, G.
- Venue
- Judgment and Decision Making
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2021-03
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 484-504
- ISSN
- 1930-2975 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4313428942
- Cited by
- 124
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 30.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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