The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Historical Kinds and the “Special Sciences”
Overview
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Citations
Cites
Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)
Fodor, J. A. (1974) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00485230 · Cited by 1,815
Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits
Russell, B., & Bergmann, G. (1949) · Physics Today · doi:10.1063/1.3066466 · Cited by 1,114
Realism, anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds
Boyd, R. (1991) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00385837 · Cited by 1,086
Semantic and Conceptual Development: An Ontological Perspective
Zwicky, A., & Keil, F. C. (1980) · The Modern Language Journal · doi:10.2307/325916 · Cited by 382
Hacking, I. (1991) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00385836 · Cited by 376
Psychological Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology.
Taylor, C., & Fodor, J. A. (1971) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184318 · Cited by 340
What Realism Implies and What it Does Not
Boyd, R. N. (1989) · Dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00928.x · Cited by 278
Philosophy and our mental life
(2010) · Mind, Language and Reality · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625251.016 · Cited by 265
FODOR, J. A. (1991) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/c.397.19 · Cited by 228
Philosophy and our Mental Life
Putnam, H. (2002) · doi:10.4324/9780203427262-26 · Cited by 223
Cited by
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Birch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Millikan, R. G.
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 1999-08
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 45-65
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W1479729289
- Cited by
- 297
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 14.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Historical Kinds and the “Special Sciences”. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1023/a:1004532016219
- The paper
- Millikan, R. G. (1999). Historical Kinds and the “Special Sciences”. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1023/a%3A1004532016219
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
