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Philosophy and our mental life

·2010·Mind, Language and Reality

Abstract

The question which troubles laymen, and which has long troubled philosophers, even if it is somewhat disguised by today's analytic style of writing philosophy, is this: are we made of matter or soul-stuff? To put it as bluntly as possible, are we just material beings, or are we ‘something more’? In this paper, I will argue as strongly as possible that this whole question rests on false assumptions. My purpose is not to dismiss the question, however, so much as to speak to the real concern which is behind the question. The real concern is, I believe, with the autonomy of our mental life. People are worried that we may be debunked, that our behavior may be exposed as really explained by something mechanical. Not, to be sure, mechanical in the old sense of cogs and pulleys, but in the newer sense of electricity and magnetism and quantum chemistry and so forth. In this paper, part of what I want to do is to argue that this can't happen. Mentality is a real and autonomous feature of our world. But even more important, at least in my feeling, is the fact that this whole question has nothing to do with our substance. Strange as it may seem to common sense and to sophisticated intuition alike, the question of the autonomy of our mental life does not hinge on and has nothing to do with that all too popular, all too old question about matter or soul-stuff.

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Metadata

Venue
Mind, Language and Reality
Published
2010-01-12
Pages
291-303
OpenAlex
W328167479
Cited by
265
References
0
FWCI
28.60
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Philosophy and our mental life. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511625251.016
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Philosophy and our mental life. (2010). Mind, Language and Reality. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511625251.016

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