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Philosophy and our mental life
Abstract
The question which troubles laymen, and which has long troubled philosophers, even if it is somewhat disguised by today's analytic style of writing philosophy, is this: are we made of matter or soul-stuff? To put it as bluntly as possible, are we just material beings, or are we ‘something more’? In this paper, I will argue as strongly as possible that this whole question rests on false assumptions. My purpose is not to dismiss the question, however, so much as to speak to the real concern which is behind the question. The real concern is, I believe, with the autonomy of our mental life. People are worried that we may be debunked, that our behavior may be exposed as really explained by something mechanical. Not, to be sure, mechanical in the old sense of cogs and pulleys, but in the newer sense of electricity and magnetism and quantum chemistry and so forth. In this paper, part of what I want to do is to argue that this can't happen. Mentality is a real and autonomous feature of our world. But even more important, at least in my feeling, is the fact that this whole question has nothing to do with our substance. Strange as it may seem to common sense and to sophisticated intuition alike, the question of the autonomy of our mental life does not hinge on and has nothing to do with that all too popular, all too old question about matter or soul-stuff.
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Citations
Cited by
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches
Piccinini, G., & Craver, C. (2011) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9898-4 · Cited by 508
Historical Kinds and the “Special Sciences”
Millikan, R. G. (1999) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1023/a:1004532016219 · Cited by 297
Laws for Metaphysical Explanation
Schaffer, J. (2017) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/phis.12111 · Cited by 133
Pragmatism, realism, and psychology: Understanding theory selection criteria
Long, D. M. (2013) · Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science · doi:10.1016/j.jcbs.2013.09.003 · Cited by 15
Individuating Cognitive Characters: Lessons from Praying Mantises and Plants
Figdor, C. (2024) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1017/psa.2024.10 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Venue
- Mind, Language and Reality
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2010-01-12
- Pages
- 291-303
- OpenAlex
- W328167479
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 28.60
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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