“When is it Selectively Advantageous to Have True Beliefs? Sandwiching the Better Safe than Sorry Argument”
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“If the costs or payoffs of false positives (detecting a signal in the environment where there is none) and false negatives (failing to detect a signal that is present in the environment) are asymmetric, natural selection will tend to promote beliefs that yield the highest payoffs or incur the least costs (Stephens, 2001).”
From Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification (2011) · cites this paper as Stephens, 2001
Citations
Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
Shafer, G. R., Kahnerman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1984) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2288362 · Cited by 5,657
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
(1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,269
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
Quine, W. V. (1969) · doi:10.7312/quin92204 · Cited by 3,593 · cited 3×
“1 Quine (1969), Ruse (1986), Sober (1980), Dennett (1978, 1987), Fodor (1981), Millikan (1984, 1987), Goldman (1986), Lycan (1988), Sorensen (1992), Nozick (1993) and Papineau (1987, 1993) all defend various claims linking evolution with true belief or rationality.”
BackgroundPsychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind
Fodor, J. A. (1987) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5684.001.0001 · Cited by 2,756
Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior
(1999) · Ethology · doi:10.1046/j.1439-0310.1999.00372.x · Cited by 2,545
How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226218526.001.0001 · Cited by 2,268
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Research works printed but not linked: 9
- Cherniak, C. (1986): Minimal Rationality, Cambridge,MA, MIT Press.
- Dennett, D. (1978): Brainstorms, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
- Fodor, J.A. (1981): “Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes,” in Representations, Cambridge,MA, MIT Press.
- Fodor, J.A. (1999): “Is Science Biologically Possible?” in In Critical Condition, Cambridge,MA, MIT Press.
- Gould, S. and Lewontin, R. (1978): “The Spandrels of San Marcos and the Panglossian Paradigm,” in E. Sober (1994) (ed.), Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, Cambridge MA, MIT Press.
- Jeffery, R. (1983): The Logic of Decision, second edition, The University of Chicago Press.
- Millikan, R. (1987): Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge MA, MIT Press.
- Sorensen, R. (1992): Thought Experiments, New York, Oxford University Press.
- Sterelny, K. (1999): “The Evolution of Agency,” in Valerie Gray Hardcastle (ed.), Where Biology meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays,Cambridge,MA, MIT Press.
Cited by
Sober, E. (2002) · The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy · doi:10.1002/9780470996362.ch12 · Cited by 671
In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity
Cowie, C. (2014) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0510-6 · Cited by 131
“And having true beliefs won’t always be of help in fulfilling goals (Stephens 2001).”
BackgroundBiological function and epistemic normativity
Sullivan‐Bissett, E. (2017) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2017.1287296 · Cited by 70
Still no lie detector for language models: probing empirical and conceptual roadblocks
Levinstein, B. A., & Herrmann, D. A. (2025) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-023-02094-3 · Cited by 50
“For example, God-frey-Smith (1991, 1998), Sober (1994), Stephens (2001), and Smead (2015) have all developed models that characterize when an agent should (be expected to) learn from its environment and then select actions based on what it learned, and when it should not.”
Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From
Cruz, H. D. (2014) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.967792 · Cited by 61
Affect-biased attention and predictive processing
Ransom, M., Fazelpour, S., Markovic, J., Kryklywy, J. H., Thompson, E. T., & Todd, R. M. (2020) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104370 · Cited by 50
“…evolutionary context, there is often a significantly higher cost to false negatives compared to false positives – misidentifying a potentially dangerous object or situation as safe may have dire consequences, while the inverse is rather benign, though there are boundaries on this (Stephens, 2001).”
BackgroundThe selective advantage of representing correctly
Nánay, B. (2023) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12942 · Cited by 40
Reformed and evolutionary epistemology and the noetic effects of sin
Cruz, H. D., & Smedt, J. D. (2012) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/s11153-012-9368-z · Cited by 42
“lust) are present in monkeys and apes as well, which makes it unlikely that these tendencies could have been caused by a single human historical act (Swinburne, 1989). The fourth key element in the Augustinian view on original sin cannot be brought in line with evolutionary theory, but then again, it is a weak element…”
BackgroundInfluentialEvolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification
De Cruz, H. (2011) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01283.x · Cited by 32
Graham, P. J. (2019) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/phis.12142 · Cited by 31
Evolved cognitive biases and the epistemic status of scientific beliefs
Cruz, H. D., & Smedt, J. D. (2010) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9661-6 · Cited by 37
Good and Good For You: An Affect Theory of Happiness
Sizer, L. (2009) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00313.x · Cited by 35
Odenbaugh, J. (2015) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0675-7 · Cited by 22
“Consider an example due to Stephen Stich (1990, pp. 61–2 though see Stephens (2001) for a reply).”
BackgroundNatural selection and rational decision: two concepts of optimization
Khalil, E. L. (2008) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-008-0120-x · Cited by 21
Simulation, simplicity, and selection: an evolutionary perspective on high-level mindreading
Schulz, A. W. (2009) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9476-5 · Cited by 18
“Innate Ideas as a Naturalistic Source of Metaphysical Knowledge”
Stewart-Williams, S. (2005) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-004-6835-7 · Cited by 16
“Stephens (2001) calls this the better-safe-than-sorry principle.”
BackgroundMonothematic delusions are misfunctioning beliefs
Sullivan‐Bissett, E. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04803-9 · Cited by 15
“To accept this is not to accept that true beliefs are always adaptive (see notable examples in Stich, 1990; Stephens, 2001; Williams, 2021), but exceptions ought not deter us from accepting the claim that they usually or often enough are (Street, 2009: 235; Cowie, 2014: 4007; Hannon, 2019: 35).”
The new evil demon problem at 40
Graham, P. J. (2024) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.13052 · Cited by 16
“When it comes to our perceptual systems, Mother Nature selected for reliability (Graham 2014a; cf. Stephens 2001, Nanay 2023).”
BackgroundPractical beliefs vs. scientific beliefs: two kinds of maximization
Khalil, E. L. (2012) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-012-9338-z · Cited by 16
The “evolutionary argument” and the metaphilosophy of commonsense
Boulter, S. J. (2006) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-006-9032-z · Cited by 23
“Second, it has already been shown that the ‘‘better-safe-thansorry argument’’ has a very narrow band of applicability ( Stephens, 2001 ).”
BackgroundDo we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?
Fassio, D., & Gao, J. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03104-9 · Cited by 11
The Cognitive Appeal of the Cosmological Argument*
Cruz, H. D., & Smedt, J. D. (2011) · Method & Theory in the Study of Religion · doi:10.1163/157006811x567715 · Cited by 11
Plantinga Redux: Is the Scientific Realist Committed to the Rejection of Naturalism?
Graber, A. D., & Golemon, L. (2019) · Sophia · doi:10.1007/s11841-018-0695-0 · Cited by 9
“…there is no tenable explanation of the correlation between our beliefs and their truth-makers (e.g., Boudry and Vlerick 2014; Law 2011; Robbins 1994; Stephens 2001; Fales 1996) and (ii) if there is no tenable explanation of the correlation between our beliefs and their truth-makers, then this…”
BackgroundWhen and why people think beliefs are “debunked” by scientific explanations of their origins
Plunkett, D., Buchak, L., & Lombrozo, T. (2019) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12238 · Cited by 10
“) Evolutionary reliabilism is hotly debated by philosophers (see, e.g., Downes, 2000; Feldman, 1988; Fodor, 2002; Plantinga, 1993; Ramsey, 2002; Sage, 2004; Stephens, 2001; Stich, 1990).”
Logic and Biology: Emotional Inference and Emotions in Reasoning
de Sousa, R. (2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814273.053 · Cited by 5
de Sousa, R. (2008) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216840.003.0016 · Cited by 5
Interpreting the probabilities in Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism
Neels, G. (2021) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09818-7 · Cited by 4
“A promising line of inquiry here would be Stephens’ (2001) "sandwiching" argument.”
BackgroundKhalil, E. L. (2010) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1162/biot_a_00022 · Cited by 6
“For instance, Stephens (2001) calls such inaccurate beliefs “better-safe-than-sorry arguments.” Such beliefs prompt agents to adopt risk-averse behavior when it appears that accurate beliefs would lead agents, at least in some occasions, to amass greater wealth or progeny.”
BackgroundA user’s guide to the evolutionary argument against naturalism
Mirza, O. (2007) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9155-3 · Cited by 4
Does absence make atheistic belief grow stronger?
Adams, S., & Robson, J. (2015) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/s11153-015-9532-3 · Cited by 2
Hypotheses that attribute false beliefs: A two‐part epistemology (Darwin + Akaike)
Roche, W. A., & Sober, E. R. (2020) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12298 · Cited by 1
Charles Darwin meets Amoeba economicus: Why Natural Selection Cannot Explain RationalityPreprint
Khalil, E. L. (2006) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1
Who We've Been All Along: Trends in Partisan Ambivalence
Boatwright, D. (2018)
Segundo, L. H. M. (2023) · Religious Studies · doi:10.1017/s0034412523000562
Feinberg, D. J. (2014) · doi:10.17077/etd.uhsqw3y8
Metadata
- Authors
- Stephens, C. L.
- Affiliations
- University of Oklahoma (US)
- Corresponding author
- Stephens, Christopher L.
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2001-08
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 161-189
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W2160622530
- Cited by
- 35
- References
- 44
- Citations by year
- 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 3 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 2.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (tdm)
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (vor)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- natural selection, belief formation, phenotypic plasticity, epistemic rationality, epistemic justification
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.