“When is it Selectively Advantageous to Have True Beliefs? Sandwiching the Better Safe than Sorry Argument”
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“If the costs or payoffs of false positives (detecting a signal in the environment where there is none) and false negatives (failing to detect a signal that is present in the environment) are asymmetric, natural selection will tend to promote beliefs that yield the highest payoffs or incur the least costs (Stephens, 2001).”
From Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification (2011) · cites this paper as Stephens, 2001
Citations
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“4 Similar models of phenotypic plasticity can also be found in Moran (1992) and Stephens (1989, 1991).”
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Cited by
Sober, E. (2002) · The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy · doi:10.1002/9780470996362.ch12 · Cited by 671
In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity
Cowie, C. (2014) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0510-6 · Cited by 131
“And having true beliefs won’t always be of help in fulfilling goals (Stephens 2001).”
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Sullivan‐Bissett, E. (2017) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2017.1287296 · Cited by 70
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“For example, God-frey-Smith (1991, 1998), Sober (1994), Stephens (2001), and Smead (2015) have all developed models that characterize when an agent should (be expected to) learn from its environment and then select actions based on what it learned, and when it should not.”
Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From
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Metadata
- Authors
- Stephens, C. L.
- Affiliations
- University of Oklahoma (US)
- Corresponding author
- Stephens, Christopher L.
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2001-08
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 161-189
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W2160622530
- Cited by
- 35
- References
- 44
- Citations by year
- 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 3 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 2.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (tdm)
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (vor)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- natural selection, belief formation, phenotypic plasticity, epistemic rationality, epistemic justification
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