The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Emotions, feelings and intentionality
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Citations
Cites
An argument for basic emotions
Ekman, P. (1992) · Cognition and Emotion · doi:10.1080/02699939208411068 · Cited by 9,646
Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state.
Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1962) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0046234 · Cited by 6,223
Jackson, F. (1982) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2960077 · Cited by 2,477
Papineau, D. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001 · Cited by 884
The harder problem of consciousness
Block, N. (2002) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/3655621 · Cited by 296 · cited 2×
“Some materialists (Papineau 2002), and their opponents of course (Block 2002), are negative about the prospects for scientific psychology of identifying the material referents of phenomenal concepts.”
Cited by
Grief and the Unity of Emotion
Ratcliffe, M. (2017) · Midwest Studies In Philosophy · doi:10.1111/misp.12071 · Cited by 63
“Instead of contrasting bodily feelings with world-directed intentionality, one could argue that some or even all bodily feelings have world-directed intentionality (Goldie, 2000, 2002; Ratcliffe, 2005, 2008).”
BackgroundAffective experience in the predictive mind: a review and new integrative account
Fernandez Velasco, P., & Loev, S. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02755-4 · Cited by 43
“Finally, feelings are not only phenomenal but also intentional states (e.g. Tye 2008; Goldie 2002; Kriegel 2014).8 They are “about” or are “directed at” something.”
BackgroundŞimşek, Ö. F. (2011) · Journal of Happiness Studies · doi:10.1007/s10902-010-9203-0 · Cited by 42
Metadata
- Authors
- Goldie, P.
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2002-09
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 235-254
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W2102461775
- Cited by
- 209
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 0.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Emotions, feelings and intentionality. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1023/a:1021306500055
- The paper
- Goldie, P. (2002). Emotions, feelings and intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1023/a%3A1021306500055
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.