The harder problem of consciousness

Abstract

The Harder Problem of Consciousness I The Hard Problem T. H. Huxley famously said ''How it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.'' 1 We do not see how to explain a state of consciousness in terms of its neurological basis.This is the Hard Problem of Consciousness. 2 The aim of this paper is to present another problem of consciousness.The Harder Problem, as I will call it, is more epistemological than the Hard Problem.A second difference: the Hard Problem could arise for someone who has no conception of another person, whereas the Harder Problem is tied closely to the problem of other minds.Finally, the Harder Problem reveals an epistemic tension or at least discomfort in our ordinary conception of consciousness that is not suggested by the Hard Problem, and so in one respect it is harder.Perhaps the Harder Problem includes the Hard Problem and is best thought of as an epistemic add-on to it.Or perhaps they are in some other way facets of a single problem.Then my point is that this single problem breaks into two parts, one of which is more epistemic, involves other minds, and involves an epistemic discomfort. II PreliminariesI believe that the major ontological disputes about the nature of consciousness rest on an opposition between two perspectives: n Deflationism about consciousness, in which a priori or at least armchair analyses of consciousness (or at least armchair-sufficient conditions) are given in nonphenomenal terms, most prominently in terms of representation, thought, or function.n Phenomenal realism, which consists in the denial of deflationism plus the claim that consciousness is something real.Phenomenal realism is metaphysical realism about (AutoPDF V7 9/1/07 10:38) MIT (Stone 7Â9") StoneSerif&Sans J-1567 Block AC1: WSL 03/01/2007 pp.397-434 1567_20 (p.