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Tax Morale, Rule-Governed Behaviour and Trust
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Torgler, B.
- Venue
- Constitutional Political Economy
- Published
- 2003-06
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 119-140
- ISSN
- 1043-4062 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-9966
- OpenAlex
- W1606766006
- Cited by
- 280
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 11.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.