The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach
Open accessAbstract
This paper characterizes the optimal securities for venture capital finance in an environment with multiple investment stages and double-sided moral hazard in the relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. We show that if the conditions relevant for continuation into later stages are verifiable, the optimal security gives the venture capitalist a constant share in the success return of the project over a predetermined set of continuation states. Otherwise, the parties sign an initial start-up contract that is later renegotiated. In this case, in order to minimize the incentive distortions associated with the burden of early financing stages, the optimal start-up security gives a zero payoff in low profitability states and thereafter an increasing share in the success return of the project.
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Citations
Cites
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Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital
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Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists
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Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
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Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective
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Monitoring, Liquidation, and Security Design
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Self-citationDefault and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
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Venture Capitalists As Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring
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Cited by
Kaplan, S., & Stromberg, P. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7660 · Cited by 1,180
Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses
KAPLAN, S. N., & STRÖMBERG, P. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00696.x · Cited by 1,091
The Impact of Venture Capital Monitoring
BERNSTEIN, S., GIROUD, X., & TOWNSEND, R. R. (2016) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12370 · Cited by 739
Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists
Casamatta, C. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00597 · Cited by 600
Entrepreneurial finance: an overview of the issues and evidence
Denis, D. J. (2004) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(03)00059-2 · Cited by 550
Metadata
- Authors
- Repullo, R., & Suarez, J.
- Venue
- Review of Finance
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-03-01
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 75-108
- ISSN
- 1382-6662 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-3097
- 1573-692X
- OpenAlex
- W3123183564
- Cited by
- 345
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 111.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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