The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
Open accessAbstract
We analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash flows, rather than to divert them. In the first part of the paper we study the optimal debt contract—specifically, the trade-off between the size of the loan and the repayment—under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal. In the second part we consider a more general class of (nondebt) contracts, and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these.
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Cites
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
Self-citationProperty Rights and the Nature of the Firm
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261729 · Cited by 5,364
Self-citationMoffitt, R. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.660 · Cited by 4,694
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Self-citationA Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting
Aghion, P., & Bolton, P. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297860 · Cited by 2,128
Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
Gale, D., & Hellwig, M. (1985) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297737 · Cited by 1,796
Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets
Diamond, D. W. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261630 · Cited by 1,621
A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118350 · Cited by 1,438
Self-citation
Cited by
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Private and Public Supply of Liquidity
Holmström, B., & Tirole, J. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250001 · Cited by 1,822
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Decisions
Hackbarth, D. (2008) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s002210900001437x · Cited by 540
Gorton, G., & Winton, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01012-4 · Cited by 304
Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, O., & Moore, J.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1998-02-01
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-41
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2133640915
- Cited by
- 1,020
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 130.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
