Dynamic mental representations.
Abstract
This article pursues the possibility that perceivers are sensitive to implicit dynamic information even when they are not able to observe real-time change. Recent empirical results in the domains of handwriting recognition and picture perception are discussed in support of the hypothesis that perception involves acquiring information about transitions, whether the stimuli are static or dynamic. It is then argued that dynamic information has a special status in mental representation as well as in perception. In particular I propose that some mental representations may be dynamic, in that a temporal dimension is necessary to the representation. Recent evidence that mental representations may exhibit a form of momentum is discussed in support of this claim. There has been a growing appreciation of the impressive ability that the human mind has for perceiving events that take place over time. J. J. Gibson (1979), Johansson (1975), and others have noted that we are particularly receptive to information contained in patterns of change in the environment, as opposed to static information (such as that contained in a snapshot). In this article I will first propose that people perceive dynamic information even when the stimuli being inspected (such as snapshots) are not changing in real time. I will then propose that the importance of dynamic information to perception has implications for mental representation. In particular I will argue that mental representations may sometimes contain a temporal dimension and may thus themselves he dynamic. Perceiving Transitions I pr~ose that in oerception, acquiring information about transitions between states is as important as acquiring information about the states themselves. I believe that the proclivity oeople show for picking up transitional information extends to situations in which the stimuli are static. A more precise proposition can be stated as follows: When the perceptual system cannot directly perceive change over time it will seek out implicit Sections of this article are based on portions of a dissertation I submitted
Cites (5)
- The Ecological Approach to Visual PerceptionBornstein, Marc H., Gibson, James J. · 1980 · The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
- The Modularity of MindFodor, Jerry A. · 1983
- REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGYBartlett, F. C., Burt, Cyril · 1933 · British Journal of Educational Psychology
- Perception of the speech code.Liberman, A. M., Cooper, F. S., Shankweiler, D. P., Studdert-Kennedy, M. · 1967 · Psychological Review
- Semantic integration of verbal information into a visual memoryLoftus, Elizabeth F., Miller, David G., Burns, Helen J. · 1978 · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory
Cited by (13)
- Perceptual symbol systemsBarsalou, Lawrence W. · 1999 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Grounded cognition.Barsalou, Lawrence W. · 2008 · Annual Review of Psychology
- Building machines that learn and think like peopleLake, Brenden M., Ullman, Tomer D., Tenenbaum, Joshua B., Gershman, Samuel J. · 2017 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Natural language and natural selectionPinker, Steven, Bloom, Paul · 1990 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertaintyCosmides, L · 1996 · Cognition
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Dynamic mental representations. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0033-295x.94.4.427
- The paper
- Freyd, J. J. (1987). Dynamic mental representations. Psychological Review. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.94.4.427
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.