Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 84 of the 84 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Research on people's confidence in their general knowledge has to date produced two fairly stable effects, many inconsistent results, and no comprehensive theory. We propose such a comprehensive framework, the theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM theory). The theory (a) explains both the overconfidence effect (mean confidence is higher than percentage of answers correct) and the hard-easy effect (overconfidence increases with item difficulty) reported in the literature and (b) predicts conditions under which both effects appear, disappear, or invert. In addition, (c) it predicts a new phenomenon, the confidence-frequency effect, a systematic difference between a judgment of confidence in a single event (i.e., that any given answer is correct) and a judgment of the frequency of correct answers in the long run. Two experiments are reported that support PMM theory by confirming these predictions, and several apparent anomalies reported in the literature are explained and integrated into the present framework.
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“Interestingly, the confidence level is not such a reliable cue for accuracy [34].”
From Social Influence and the Collective Dynamics of Opinion Formation (2013) · cites this paper as [34]
Citations
Cites
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“that subjects' neglect of base rates in Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) engineer-lawyer problem disappeared if subjects could randomly draw the descriptions from an urn.”
BackgroundJournal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory
Bourne, L. E. (1977) · Cited by 4,328
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
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Decision analysis and behavioral research
von Winterfeldt, D., & Edwards, W. (1986) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 3,042
Duncker, K. (1945) · Psychological Monographs · doi:10.1037/h0093599 · Cited by 2,938
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Cited by
Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1121 · Cited by 7,731
“Gigerenzer (1991) and his colleagues ( Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991 ) have argued that the types of probability estimates used in traditional overconfidence work—namely, those concerning the occurrence of single events—are fundamentally flawed.”
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises
Nickerson, R. S. (1998) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175 · Cited by 7,267
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504
“…from the framework of PMM theory have been successful in integrating various striking phenomena in inference from memory and predicting novel phenomena, such as the confidence-frequency effect (Gigerenzer et al., 1991) and the less-is-more effect (Goldstein, 1994; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1996).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationRepresentativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Metadata
- Authors
- Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbölting, H.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 1991
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 506-528
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2150234857
- Cited by
- 1,506
- References
- 84
- Citations by year
- 2026: 32 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 31 · 2019: 65 · 2018: 41 · 2017: 51 · 2016: 50 · 2015: 52 · 2014: 51 · 2013: 49 · 2012: 76
- FWCI
- 8.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
- Center for Advanced Study, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Psychometric Methodologies and Testing
- Keywords
- confidence judgments, overconfidence, metacognition, general knowledge, item difficulty
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Humans, Judgment, Probability Theory, Self Concept
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- Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbölting, H. (1991). Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence. Psychological Review. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.98.4.506
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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