Social Influence and the Collective Dynamics of Opinion Formation
Open accessAbstract
Social influence is the process by which individuals adapt their opinion, revise their beliefs, or change their behavior as a result of social interactions with other people. In our strongly interconnected society, social influence plays a prominent role in many self-organized phenomena such as herding in cultural markets, the spread of ideas and innovations, and the amplification of fears during epidemics. Yet, the mechanisms of opinion formation remain poorly understood, and existing physics-based models lack systematic empirical validation. Here, we report two controlled experiments showing how participants answering factual questions revise their initial judgments after being exposed to the opinion and confidence level of others. Based on the observation of 59 experimental subjects exposed to peer-opinion for 15 different items, we draw an influence map that describes the strength of peer influence during interactions. A simple process model derived from our observations demonstrates how opinions in a group of interacting people can converge or split over repeated interactions. In particular, we identify two major attractors of opinion: (i) the expert effect, induced by the presence of a highly confident individual in the group, and (ii) the majority effect, caused by the presence of a critical mass of laypeople sharing similar opinions. Additional simulations reveal the existence of a tipping point at which one attractor will dominate over the other, driving collective opinion in a given direction. These findings have implications for understanding the mechanisms of public opinion formation and managing conflicting situations in which self-confident and better informed minorities challenge the views of a large uninformed majority.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
Two controlled experiments show how people revise factual judgments after seeing another person’s opinion and confidence, yielding an empirical “influence map” of opinion adaptation. A model derived from these data reveals that collective opinion is driven by two attractors—the expert effect and the majority effect—with a tipping point around 15% experts.
Key findings
- Initial opinions followed a lognormal distribution: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on log opinions yielded p-values above .05 for 84% of the 32 items.
- Confidence was a weak cue for accuracy: the correlation between confidence and error was –.03; only maximum confidence (Ci = 6) was a good indicator, corresponding to a good or very good estimate 80% of the time, while Ci = 5 had a 39% chance of a bad or very bad estimate and Ci = 4 was more likely to accompany a bad or very bad estimate (53%) than a good or very good one (47%).
- In 885 binary interactions, most people kept their initial opinion (53%), 43% made a compromise, and 4% adopted the other’s opinion; social influence was strongest at intermediate opinion distances.
- Simulations identified two major attractors: the expert effect from highly confident individuals and the majority effect from a critical mass of low-confidence individuals sharing an opinion; the majority effect overcame the expert effect below about 10% experts, with a transition around 15% experts that remained stable even with neutral individuals until noise dominated above 70% neutral individuals.
Methods
- Experiment 1: 52 participants answered 32 general knowledge questions and rated confidence on a 6-point scale, producing 1,664 data points used to characterize initial opinions and confidence-accuracy.
- Experiment 2: 59 participants answered 15 questions, then saw another randomly selected Experiment 1 participant’s estimate and confidence and gave revised estimate and confidence, yielding 885 binary interactions used to build the influence map.
- The authors derived a decision-tree/individual-based model from the influence map and ran numerical simulations with the 52 initial agents paired randomly over N = 300 rounds, plus additional simulations varying proportions of experts, majority, and neutral individuals.
Limitations
- The paper states that neutral factual questions were used to control emotional impact, and that future work should test how the influence map changes with emotions and subjective beliefs.
- The paper states that the assumption that the decision tree remains identical over repeated interactions needs verification, and that simulation outcomes require empirical validation.
- The paper notes that edge zones of the influence map are uncertain due to scarce data, and that very remote opinions rarely occurred, so conclusions there are not reliable; it also makes evident that model parameters were extracted from the same experimental data used to build the model.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 34 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data
There is no significant correlation between an individual's confidence level and the quality of their answer (correlation coefficient -.03).
“First, we found no significant correlation between an individual i’s confidence level Ci and the quality of his or her answer (a correlation test between Ci and the error where T is the true value yielded a coefficient of –.03).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingcitation
The majority of people systematically keep their opinion when their own confidence exceeds their partner's.
“In particular, the majority of people systematically keep their opinion when the value of is positive, that is, when their own confidence exceeds their partner’s [30].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [30] J Soll, 2009, Strategies for revising judgment: How (and how well) people use others’ opinions, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingown data
The confidence level is not a reliable cue for accuracy.
“Interestingly, the confidence level is not such a reliable cue for accuracy [34].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [34] G Gigerenzer, 1991, Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence, Psychological Review source
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingown data
After social influence, the distribution of errors for very confident individuals (Ci = 5 or 6) becomes more noisy, widespread and clustered around certain values, thus becoming less informative about accuracy.
“As shown in Fig. 2B, the distribution of errors for very confident individuals (Ci = 5 or 6) becomes more noisy, widespread and clustered around certain values thus becoming less informative about accuracy after social influence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
A critical amount of approximately 15% of experts is necessary to counteract the attractive effect of a large majority of lay individuals.
“In particular, we show that a critical amount of approximately 15% of experts is necessary to counteract the attractive effect of a large majority of lay individuals.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree extracted from the experiment remains the same over repeated interactions.
- Rests on an assumption: The experimental sample and the derived decision tree are representative of large groups of interacting people.
- Findingown data
Only the maximum confidence level Ci = 6 is a relevant indicator of the quality of the answer, leading to a good or very good estimate in 80% of the time.
“As it can be seen from Fig. 1B, only the maximum confidence level Ci = 6 is a relevant indicator of the quality of the answer, leading to a good or very good estimate in 80% of the time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
When their confidence level is equal or lower than their partner's, individuals tend to adapt their opinion accordingly.
“However, when their confidence level is equal or lower than their partner’s, individuals tend to adapt their opinion accordingly.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
After social influence, error distributions tend to become widespread, covering a greater proportion of high error values, regardless of the aggregating method.
“We find that the error distributions tend to become widespread, now covering a greater proportion of also high error values after social influence, regardless of the aggregating method.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [29] J Lorenz, 2011, How social influence can undermine the wisdom of crowd effect, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [35] A King, 2012, Is the true “wisdom of the crowd” to copy successful individuals?, Biology Letters source
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation
Two variables have an important influence on how an individual revises their opinion when exposed to the opinion and confidence of another participant: the difference in confidence values and the normalized distance between opinions.
“In agreement with previous studies [6], [30], our results show that two variables have an important influence on how the individual i revises his or her opinion when exposed to the opinion and confidence of another participant j: the difference in confidence values and the normalized distance between opinions”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [6] I Yaniv, 2004, Receiving other people’s advice: Influence and benefit, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [30] J Soll, 2009, Strategies for revising judgment: How (and how well) people use others’ opinions, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingown data
The reliability of high confidence judgments is undermined by social influence.
“Taking the revised estimates of Experiment 2 into account, we observe that the reliability of high confidence judgments is undermined by social influence [29].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [29] J Lorenz, 2011, How social influence can undermine the wisdom of crowd effect, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingown data
The first and more conservative strategy (keeping one's initial opinion) tends to dominate the other two strategies.
“Figure 3A shows that the first and more conservative strategy tends to dominate the two others.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Feedback has the strongest influence at intermediate levels of disagreement (0.3 < distance < 1.1).
“It turns out that feedback has the strongest influence at intermediate levels of disagreement, when 0.3<<1.1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The model reproduces the observed trend of bias toward one's own initial opinion.
“As shown in Fig. 3B, the same trend has been transferred to the model.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
When a cluster of low-confidence individuals sharing opinion Omaj faces a minority of high-confidence experts holding opinion Oexp, the majority effect overcomes the expert effect when the proportion of experts pExp is lower than a threshold around 10%.
“As shown by Fig. 6A, the majority effect overcomes the expert effect when the proportion of experts pExp is lower than a certain threshold value located around 10%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Findingown data
In the first simulation rounds, low-confidence individuals show important movements of opinions without an increase in confidence.
“the first rounds of the simulation exhibit important movements of opinions among low-confidence individuals (as indicated by the large horizontal arrows for confidence lower than 3), without increase of confidence (as shown in Fig. S2).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Findingown data
In the intermediate disagreement zone, the confidence level of participants tends to remain the same after the interaction.
“In particular, the confidence level of the participants tends to remain the same after the interaction (Fig. 4B).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In the very large distance zone, the majority of people still choose the 'compromise' heuristic when the partner is markedly more confident.
“Nevertheless, the other’s opinion is not entirely ignored, as the majority of people still choose the “compromise” heuristic when the partner is markedly more confident (i.e. ).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The system does not systematically converge toward or away from the true value.
“Likewise, the system does not systematically converge toward or away from the true value (nonsignificant effect with a coefficient c = .11).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Findingreasoning
The presence of one or a few highly confident individuals acts as an attractor.
“The second attractor is the presence of one or a few highly confident individuals, as illustrated by Fig. 5-Example3.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Findingown data
The transition point remains stable even when a proportion pNeut of neutral individuals are present in the system.
“Remarkably, this transition point remains stable even when a proportion pNeut of neutral individuals (defined as people with random opinions and a low confidence level) are present in the system (Fig. 6B).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Findingown data
The amplification process in the simulations is marked by a sharp transition of the system's global confidence level.
“This amplification process is also marked by a sharp transition of the system’s global confidence level (Fig. S2), which is a typical signature of phase transitions in complex systems [2].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Findingown data
Participants exhibited a significant bias toward their own initial opinion rather than equally weighting all social information they were exposed to.
“The first result of our experiment is that participants exhibited a significant bias toward their own initial opinion rather than equally weighting all social information they were exposed to [6], [30].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [6] I Yaniv, 2004, Receiving other people’s advice: Influence and benefit, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [30] J Soll, 2009, Strategies for revising judgment: How (and how well) people use others’ opinions, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingown data
Even when the compromise strategy is chosen, individuals still give a stronger weight to their own initial opinion.
“Moreover, even when the “compromise” strategy is chosen, individuals still give a stronger weight to their own initial opinion, which has also been implemented in the model.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The collective opinion in the simulations does not converge toward the average value of initial opinions.
“An intriguing finding of our simulations is that the collective opinion does not converge toward the average value of initial opinions (a correlation test yields a nonsignificant effect with a coefficient c = -.05).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Findingcitation
When the distance between opinions is very large (>1), the strength of social influence diminishes progressively.
“Finally, when the distance between opinions is very large (i.e., >1), the strength of social influence diminishes progressively [6].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [6] I Yaniv, 2004, Receiving other people’s advice: Influence and benefit, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes source
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingcitation
The presence of a significant number of neutral individuals holding random opinions and low confidence around the attractive forces tends to increase the unpredictability of the final outcome.
“Moreover, the presence of a significant number of neutral individuals holding a random opinion and a low confidence level around these two attractive forces tends to increase the unpredictability of the final outcome [15].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [15] M Salganik, 2006, Experimental study of inequality and unpredictability in an artificial cultural market, Science source
Not checked in the free run.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Findingown data
As pNeut increases above 70%, noise gradually dominates, leading the expert and majority effects to vanish.
“As pNeut increases above 70%, however, noise gradually starts to dominate, leading the expert and the majority effects to vanish.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Findingown data
Very confident individuals exert strong persuasive power.
“First, very confident individuals exert strong persuasive power, as shown by the influence map.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Findingown data
Simulation results identified two elements that can cause amplification loops: the expert effect and the majority effect.
“Our simulation results also identified two elements that can cause such amplification loops: the expert effect—induced by the presence of a highly confident individual, and the majority effect—induced by a critical mass of low-confidence individuals sharing similar opinions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Findingown data
A critical mass of uncertain individuals sharing a similar opinion acts as an attractor: when such a cluster is initially present, the rest of the crowd tends to converge toward it.
“The first attractor is the presence of a critical mass of uncertain individuals who happen to share a similar opinion. In fact, when such a cluster of individuals is initially present in the system—either by chance or because individuals share a common bias—the rest of the crowd tends to converge toward it, as illustrated by Fig. 5-Example2.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Findingown data
Even a mild influence has a significant impact on the reliability of high confidence cues.
“It is remarkable that even a mild influence has a significant impact on the reliability of high confidence cues, as shown in Fig. 2B.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The correlation between the convergence point and the median value of initial opinions is significant but weak.
“The correlation between the convergence point and the median value of the initial opinions is significant (p = .03) but the relatively moderate correlation coefficient c = 0.46 suggests that this relation remains weak.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Premisecitation
When facing the opinions of peers on a given issue, people tend to filter and integrate the social information they receive and adjust their own beliefs accordingly.
“When facing the opinions of peers on a given issue, people tend to filter and integrate the social information they receive and adjust their own beliefs accordingly [6], [7].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [6] I Yaniv, 2004, Receiving other people’s advice: Influence and benefit, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [7] Gigerenzer G, Todd P (1999) Simple heuristics that make us smart. Oxford University Press.
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- Study design and conductown data
All parameter values in the model were directly extracted from the observations.
“Here, all the parameter values were directly extracted from the observations (Fig.3B and Fig.4).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The majority effect is typical of conformity experiments, where a large number of people sharing the same opinion have a strong social influence on others.
“This majority effect is typical of conformity experiments that have been conducted in the past [37], where a large number of people sharing the same opinion have a strong social influence on others.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [37] SE Asch, 1955, Opinions and social pressure, Scientific American
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- Interpretationcitation
The increase of confidence supports the emergence of basins of attraction during collective opinion dynamics by boosting the attractive power of individuals sharing a similar opinion.
“Second, the increase of confidence supports the emergence of basins of attraction during collective opinion dynamics by boosting the attractive power of individuals sharing a similar opinion [29].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [29] J Lorenz, 2011, How social influence can undermine the wisdom of crowd effect, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Study design and conductcitation
The initial conditions of the simulations correspond to the exact starting configurations observed in the experiments (the precise opinion and confidence values of all 52 participants observed in the first experiment).
“The initial conditions of our simulations correspond to the exact starting configurations observed in our experiments (i.e., the precise opinion and confidence values of all 52 participants observed in the first experiment) [36].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [36] L Valori, 2012, Reconciling long-term cultural diversity and short-term collective social behavior, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
The simulations exhibit complex collective dynamics in which the combined effect of various elements can drive the group in one direction or another.
“Instead, the simulations exhibit complex collective dynamics in which the combined effect of various elements can drive the group in one direction or another.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Interpretationreasoning
The simulations allowed unraveling the precise mechanisms of opinion dynamics in large groups of people, which would have been practically impossible under laboratory conditions.
“Our simulations allowed us to unravel the precise mechanisms of opinion dynamics in large groups of people, which would have been practically impossible to characterize under laboratory conditions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Interpretationreasoning
An important ingredient underlying the collective dynamics but lacking in previous modeling approaches is the specific interplay between opinion changes and confidence changes.
“In particular, an important ingredient underlying the collective dynamics but lacking in previous modeling approaches is the specific interplay between opinion changes and confidence changes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Interpretationreasoning
Simulated individuals do not constantly change their opinion but progressively converge toward a stable value in a realistic manner.
“Therefore, simulated individuals do not constantly change their opinion but progressively converge toward a stable value in a realistic manner.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
- Interpretationreasoning
The main problem induced by social influence is that people tend to become more confident after noticing that other people have similar opinions.
“The main problem induced by social influence is that people tend to become more confident after noticing that other people have similar opinions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The observation that contradictory feedback is underestimated and corroborating opinions increase confidence is consistent with confirmation bias in psychology.
“This observation is consistent with the so-called confirmation bias in psychology, namely, the tendency of people to pay more attention to information confirming their initial beliefs than information they disagree with [41], [42].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [41] Baron J (2000) Thinking and deciding. Cambridge University Press.
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- cites [42] R Nickerson, 1998, Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises, Review of General Psychology source
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- May combine two claims. 29
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 12
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataLower confidence levels are less informative about accuracy; for example, Ci = 5 has a 39% chance to correspond to a bad or very bad estimate, and Ci = 4 is more likely to accompany a bad or very bad estimate (53%) than a good or very good one (47%).
“For instance, the second highest confidence value of Ci = 5 has a 39% chance to correspond to a bad or very bad estimate. Similarly, a value of Ci = 4 is more likely to accompany a bad or very bad estimate (53%) than a good or very good one (47%).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataInitial opinions follow a lognormal distribution, with a long tail indicating the significant presence of outliers.
“As shown in the example in Fig. 1A, the initial distribution of opinions has a lognormal shape, with a typical long tail indicating the significant presence of outliers.”
- Also stated in: § Experimental results · hedged
“The test yielded p-values above.05 for 84% of the items, indicating that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level for these items. The remaining 16% still had reasonably high p-values (always >10−3), suggesting that the initial opinions Oi indeed follow a lognormal distribution.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § Experimental results · hedged
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn the intermediate disagreement zone, the 'compromise' heuristic is selected by most people when [condition], and the 'adoption' heuristic appears for lower values of [condition].
“In this zone, the “compromise” heuristic is selected by most people when , and the “adoption” heuristic appears for lower values of .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataWhen both individuals have a similar opinion (distance <0.3), individuals tend to keep their initial judgment, irrespective of their partner's confidence, and have a strong tendency to increase their confidence level.
“First, when both individuals have a similar opinion (<0.3), individuals tend to keep their initial judgment, irrespective of their partner’s confidence. Moreover, they also have a strong tendency to increase their confidence level”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationIn the compromise strategy, the average weight value measured from the data was less than 0.5, indicating that people exhibited a bias toward their own initial opinion.
“When the individual chooses the “compromise” strategy, that is when , the average weight value as measured from our data equals to (SD = 0.24), indicating that people did not move exactly between their initial estimate and the feedback (which would correspond to a weight value of 0.5), but exhibited a bias toward their own initial opinion [30].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [30] J Soll, 2009, Strategies for revising judgment: How (and how well) people use others’ opinions, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
FindingreasoningJudgments of high confidence are good indicators of accuracy before social influence occurs, but no longer after people have been exposed to the opinion of others.
“Interestingly, judgments of high confidence are good indicators of accuracy before social influence occurs, but no longer after people have been exposed to the opinion of others.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataContradictory feedback is typically underestimated or ignored, while opinions corroborating one's initial opinion trigger an increase in confidence.
“Therefore, contradictory feedback is typically underestimated—if not completely ignored—but opinions corroborating one’s initial opinion trigger an increase in confidence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataWhen the distance is intermediate, the confidence level is changed only if [condition]; in this case, Ci increases with probability p = 0.5, and remains the same otherwise.
“The data shows that the confidence level is changed only if (Fig. 4B). In this case, Ci increases with probability p = 0.5, and remains the same otherwise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataOver all data points, 53% correspond to the first strategy (keep own opinion), 43% to the second (compromise), and 4% to the third (adopt other opinion).
“Over all our data points, 53% correspond to the first strategy (), 43% to the second (), and 4% to the third ().”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn the simulations, although some opinion fragmentation remains, a majority of individuals converge toward a similar opinion.
“Although a certain level of opinion fragmentation still remains, a majority of individuals converge toward a similar opinion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
May combine two claims.
FindingcitationUnconfident people tend to increase their own confidence after interacting with a very confident person, creating a basin of attraction around that person's opinion.
“Second, unconfident people tend to increase their own confidence after interacting with a very confident person, creating a basin of attraction around that person’s opinion [38], [39].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [38] I Couzin, 2005, Effective leadership and decision-making in animal groups on the move, Nature source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [39] J Dyer, 2008, Leadership, consensus decision making and collective behaviour in humans, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences source
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- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataAs pExp increases from 10% to 20%, a transition occurs and the convergence point shifts from the majority to the experts' opinion.
“However, as pExp increases from 10%, to 20% a transition occurs and the convergence point shifts from the majority to the experts’ opinion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataWhen the distance is small, the confidence level Ci is increased by one point if [condition], and is also increased by one point with probability p = 0.5 when [condition], and remains the same otherwise.
“Additionally, the confidence level Ci is increased by one point if . As indicated by Fig. 4A, Ci is also increased by one point with a probability p = 0.5 when , and remains the same otherwise.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataWhen the distance is large, the confidence level decreases by one point when [condition], and remains the same otherwise.
“This time, the confidence level decreases by one point when , and remains the same otherwise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
FindingreasoningPeople who are initially very confident exhibit a high likelihood (almost 70%) of reducing their confidence level when the distance between opinions is very large.
“Moreover, people who are initially very confident (i.e. ) presumably begin to doubt the accuracy of their judgment and exhibit a high likelihood (of almost 70%) of reducing their confidence level.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningExposing participants to another participant's estimate and confidence and asking them to revise renders opinion changes traceable and the effects of social influence measurable at the individual level.
“This procedure renders opinion changes traceable, and the effects of social influence measureable at the individual level.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe mechanisms of opinion formation remain poorly understood, and existing physics-based models lack systematic empirical validation.
“Yet, the mechanisms of opinion formation remain poorly understood, and existing physics-based models lack systematic empirical validation.”
- Also stated in: § Introduction · plain
“these simulation-based contributions share a common drawback: the absence of empirical verification of the models’ assumptions [28].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [28] P Sobkowicz, 2009, Modelling opinion formation with physics tools: Call for closer link with reality, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
Not checked in the free run.
- Also stated in: § Introduction · plain
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe findings of local rules of opinion adaptation have not yet been used to study the collective dynamics of the system, and it remains unclear how social influence plays out in larger scale social contexts over time.
“However, the findings of local rules of opinion adaptation have not yet been used to study the collective dynamics of the system, and it remains unclear how social influence plays out in larger scale social contexts over time [31].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [31] W Mason, 2007, Situating social influence processes: Dynamic, multidirectional flows of influence within social networks, Personality and Social Psychology Review source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe area of agreement (similar opinions) can be interpreted as a confirmation zone, where feedback tends to simultaneously reinforce initial opinions and increase an individual's confidence.
“Therefore, we interpret this area of agreement as being a confirmation zone, where feedback tends to simultaneously reinforce initial opinions and increase an individual’s confidence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductcitationAsking neutral, general knowledge questions allows capturing the mechanisms of opinion adaptation while controlling its emotional impact.
“Following the methods of existing experiments, we deliberately asked neutral, general knowledge questions, which allows capturing the mechanisms of opinion adaptation while controlling its emotional impact [6], [30].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [6] I Yaniv, 2004, Receiving other people’s advice: Influence and benefit, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [30] J Soll, 2009, Strategies for revising judgment: How (and how well) people use others’ opinions, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationPeople sharing similar extreme opinions, such as racial prejudices, tend to strengthen their judgment and confidence after interacting with one another.
“it has been shown that people sharing similar extreme opinions, such as racial prejudices, tend to strengthen their judgment and confidence after interacting with one another [12].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [12] D Myers, 1970, Discussion effects on racial attitudes, Science source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe collective dynamics of opinion formation in large groups of people are driven by two major attractors of opinion: the presence of a highly confident individual and the presence of clusters of low-confidence individuals sharing a similar opinion.
“By exploring a simple model derived from our observations, we demonstrate that the collective dynamics of opinion formation in large groups of people are driven by two major “attractors of opinion”: (i) the presence of a highly confident individual and (ii) the presence of clusters of low-confidence individuals sharing a similar opinion.”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
“In particular, we identify two major attractors of opinion: (i) the expert effect, induced by the presence of a highly confident individual in the group, and (ii) the majority effect, caused by the presence of a critical mass of laypeople sharing similar opinions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree extracted from the experiment remains the same over repeated interactions.
- Rests on an assumption: The experimental sample and the derived decision tree are representative of large groups of interacting people.
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenThe study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development.
“The present study has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationEarly experiments showed that opinions tend to get reinforced by group discussions involving people who initially share a similar judgment.
“This result is also in line with early experiments showing that opinions tend to get reinforced by group discussions that involve people who initially share a similar judgment [12].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [12] D Myers, 1970, Discussion effects on racial attitudes, Science source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenThe order of the questions was randomized for each participant.
“The order of the questions was randomized for each participant.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenThe macroscopic features of the system are only visible when a large number of people interact many times, making it extremely difficult to investigate under laboratory conditions.
“Because the macroscopic features of the system are only visible when a large number of people interact many times, it would be extremely difficult to investigate this under laboratory conditions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationRecent studies on animal groups have shown that the presence of uninformed individuals in fish schools acts in favor of the numerical majority, at the expense of very opinionated individuals.
“By contrast, recent studies on animal groups have shown that the presence of uninformed individuals in fish schools acts in favor of the numerical majority, at the expense of very opinionated individuals [1].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [1] I Couzin, 2011, Uninformed individuals promote democratic consensus in animal groups, Science source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningConfidence serves as a system memory: over simulation rounds, individuals are less easily influenced because their confidence level gradually increases as they receive new feedback.
“First, confidence serves as a sort of system memory. In fact, over simulation rounds, individuals are less easily influenced by others because their confidence level gradually increases as they receive new feedback.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataA correlation test of accuracy of answers and question order yielded non-significant p-values for 90% of participants with p>0.05, confirming the absence of any learning process over experimental rounds.
“A correlation test of the accuracy of answers and the order of the questions yielded non-significant p-values for 90% of participants with a probability p>0.05, confirming the absence of any learning process over experimental rounds.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningHigh confidence is an indicator of accuracy when judgments are independent but becomes an indicator of consensus when social influence takes place.
“Therefore, high confidence is an indicator of accuracy when judgments are independent but becomes an indicator of consensus when social influence takes place [43], [44].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe process often turns out to be detrimental to the group because local confidence may grow artificially, providing false cues and triggering a snowball effect that may drive the group in an erroneous direction.
“This process often turns out to be detrimental to the group, because the local amount of confidence may grow artificially in a given region of the opinion space, which provides false cues to others and triggers a snowball effect that may drive the group in an erroneous direction.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe presence of these elements confirms that the experimental design captured the fundamental mechanisms of social influence, and factual questions can be used to some extent to study fundamental features of opinion dynamics.
“The presence of these elements confirms that our experimental design has indeed captured the fundamental mechanisms of social influence, and that factual questions can be used, to some extent, to study the fundamental features of opinion dynamics [29].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [29] J Lorenz, 2011, How social influence can undermine the wisdom of crowd effect, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe collective outcome appears poorly predictable and strongly dependent on initial conditions.
“In agreement with previous works [15], the collective outcome appears to be poorly predictable and strongly dependent on the initial conditions [36].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [15] M Salganik, 2006, Experimental study of inequality and unpredictability in an artificial cultural market, Science source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [36] L Valori, 2012, Reconciling long-term cultural diversity and short-term collective social behavior, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences source
Not checked in the free run.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenAll participants gave written and informed consent to the experimental procedure.
“All participants gave written and informed consent to the experimental procedure.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe majority effect and the expert effect are not systematically beneficial to the group, as both attractors could drive the group away from the truth.
“Our simulations show that the majority effect and the expert effect are not systematically beneficial to the group, as both attractors could possibly drive the group away from the truth (Fig. 5-Example 2).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningNeutral individuals make the crowd less vulnerable to the influence of opinion attractors, and thus less predictable.
“Therefore, neutral individuals make the crowd less vulnerable to the influence of opinion attractors, and thus less predictable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenN = 300 rounds of simulated interactions were performed, chosen large enough to ensure that the system reached a stationary state.
“We performed N = 300 rounds of simulated interactions, where N has been chosen large enough to ensure that the system has reached a stationary state.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationcitationThe sharp transition of the system's global confidence level is a typical signature of phase transitions in complex systems.
“This amplification process is also marked by a sharp transition of the system’s global confidence level (Fig. S2), which is a typical signature of phase transitions in complex systems [2].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [2] Camazine S, Deneubourg J-L, Franks N, Sneyd J, Theraulaz G, <etal>et al</etal>.. (2001) Self-organization in biological systems. Princeton University Press. source
Not checked in the free run.
The authors state this as an assumption.
The decision tree extracted from the experiment remains the same over repeated interactions.
“Here, we make the assumption that the decision tree that has been extracted from our experiment remains the same over repeated interactions.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The experimental sample and the derived decision tree are representative of large groups of interacting people.
“Having characterized the effects of social influence at the individual level, we now scale up to the collective level and study how repeated influences among many people play out at the population scale.”
“By exploring a simple model derived from our observations, we demonstrate that the collective dynamics of opinion formation in large groups of people are driven by two major “attractors of opinion””
The authors state this as an assumption.
The decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.
“Besides, another important follow-up study that should be conducted in the near future is the verification of our assumption that the decision tree observed at the first round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The empirical Twitter data sets show a bimodal shape of expressed opinions across all three considered data sets.
“The data on x i yield the distributions of expressed opinions, P ( x ), which show a bimodal shape across all three considered data sets (see Fig. S1(a) in Ref. [47]).”
From Modeling echo chambers and polarization dynamics in social networks (2020) · cites this paper as [2]
For all three Twitter topics (guncontrol, Obamacare, abortion), user engagement rises towards the extremes of opinion space.
“Fig. 3(a) shows the average engagement, or activity a , of users as a function of their opinions x . For all three topics under consideration, the engagement rises towards the extremes of opinion space.”
From Modeling echo chambers and polarization dynamics in social networks (2020) · cites this paper as [2]
The model qualitatively reproduces opinion segregation in the interaction network (echo chambers) observed in empirical data.
“Both our model (Fig. 4(a)) and empirical data (Figs. 4(b) - (d)) clearly show two bright areas characterized by a high density of users with likely-minded neighbors, identifying two echo chambers corresponding to opposite opinion groups.”
From Modeling echo chambers and polarization dynamics in social networks (2020) · cites this paper as [2]
The model qualitatively reproduces the observed relation between users' engagement and opinions in polarized Twitter debates: more active users tend to show more extreme opinions.
“Compared with empirical data of polarized debates on Twitter, the model qualitatively reproduces the observed relation between users' engagement and opinions”
From Modeling echo chambers and polarization dynamics in social networks (2020) · cites this paper as [2]
Several empirical features of social networks characterized by echo chambers and their relations to opinion polarization have not been addressed within a unified modeling framework.
“Although, echo chambers and modular network structures were previously also related to homophily [29, 30], several empirical features of social networks characterized by echo chambers [2, 16, 17, 30] and their relations to opinion polarization have not been addressed within a unified modeling framework.”
From Modeling echo chambers and polarization dynamics in social networks (2020) · cites this paper as [2]
Echo chambers have been quantified in several controversial debates on different social media platforms and may be related to the spread of misinformation.
“Echo chambers have been quantified in several controversial debates on different social media platforms [2, 16, 17] and may be related to the spread of misinformation [18].”
From Modeling echo chambers and polarization dynamics in social networks (2020) · cites this paper as [2]
The datasets used in this work have been collected, analyzed and validated in previous works [2-4].
“The datasets used in this work have been collected, analyzed and validated in previous works [2-4].”
From Modeling echo chambers and polarization dynamics in social networks (2020) · cites this paper as [2]
In Ref. [2], for each dataset, the directed follower network among users has been reconstructed: a directed link from node u to node v indicates that user u follows user v.
“In Ref. [2], for each dataset, the directed follower network among users has been reconstructed: a directed link from node u to node v indicates that user u follows user v .”
From Modeling echo chambers and polarization dynamics in social networks (2020) · cites this paper as [2]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Intermediate and far opinion-distance ranges overlap
MinorThe stated intermediate range extends up to 1.1, while the far range starts above 1. Distances between 1 and 1.1 therefore fall into both zones.
“It turns out that feedback has the strongest influence at intermediate levels of disagreement, when 0.3<<1.1.”
“Finally, when the distance between opinions is very large (i.e., >1), the strength of social influence diminishes progressively [6].”
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“Similarly, Moussaïd et al. (2013) discovered that opinions expressed with high confidence tend to have a greater influence on the final group decision, as confidence can signal competence or authority.”
- Authors
- Moussaïd, M., Kämmer, J. E., Analytis, P. P., & Neth, H.
- Affiliations
- Max Planck Institute for Human Development (DE)
- Max Planck Society (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Moussaïd, Mehdi
- Venue
- PLoS ONE
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2013-11-05
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- e78433
- ISSN
- 1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC3818331
- OpenAlex
- W2019976298
- Semantic Scholar
- 4fb20ba0e882ba9a92952c3e333407327a7f1d8f
- Cited by
- 407
- References
- 52
- Citations by year
- 2026: 29 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 40 · 2023: 36 · 2022: 38 · 2021: 37 · 2020: 43 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 24 · 2017: 28 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 9.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
- Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Funders
- Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Network Analysis Techniques
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed Control Multi-Agent Systems
- Keywords
- social influence, opinion formation, peer influence, influence maps, tipping points, attractors, collective dynamics, confidence, public opinion, herding behavior, diffusion of innovations
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Adult, Attitude, Conflict, Psychological, Culture, Expert Testimony, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Models, Psychological, Peer Group, Public Opinion
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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