Reasoning about necessity and possibility: A test of the mental model theory of deduction.
Abstract
This article examined syllogistic reasoning that differs from previous research in 2 significant ways: (a) Participants were asked to decide whether conclusions were possible as well as necessary, and (b) every possible combination of syllogistic premises and conclusions was presented for evaluation with both single-premise (Experiment 1) and double-premise (Experiment 2) problems. Participants more frequently endorsed conclusions as possible than as necessary, and differences in response to the 2 forms of instruction conformed to several predictions derived from the mental model theory of deduction. Findings of Experiments 2 and 3 showed that some fallacies are consistently endorsed and others consistently resisted when people are asked to judge whether conclusions that are only possible follow necessarily. This finding was accounted for by the computational implementation of the model theory: Fallacies are made when the first mental model of the premises considered supports the conclusion presented. Traditional applications of logic concern the validity of arguments, that is, proving that some conclusion is necessary given some premises. However, in everyday reasoning
Cites (1)
- The Probability Heuristics Model of Syllogistic ReasoningChater, Nick, Oaksford, Mike · 1999 · Cognitive Psychology
Cited by (15)
- Intuition, reason, and metacognitionThompson, Valerie A., Prowse Turner, Jamie A., Pennycook, Gordon · 2011 · Cognitive Psychology
- The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluationEvans, Jonathan St. B. T. · 2006 · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Mental models and human reasoningJohnson-Laird, Philip N. · 2010 · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Cultural preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoningNorenzayan, A · 2002 · Cognitive Science
- Logic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm.Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. · 2002 · Psychological Bulletin
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Reasoning about necessity and possibility: A test of the mental model theory of deduction. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0278-7393.25.6.1495
- The paper
- St. B. T. Evans, J., Handley, S. J., Harper, C. N. J., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1999). Reasoning about necessity and possibility: A test of the mental model theory of deduction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1037//0278-7393.25.6.1495
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