The DOI matches its Crossref record; 126 of the 126 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Intuition, reason, and metacognition
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Citations
Cites
On the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202
(1999) · Cited by 6,104
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
Frederick, S. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005775196732 · Cited by 5,256
The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.
Sloman, S. A. (1996) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037//0033-2909.119.1.3 · Cited by 3,848
Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart
Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999) · Cited by 3,550
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Processing Fluency and Aesthetic Pleasure: Is Beauty in the Perceiver's Processing Experience?
Reber, R., Schwarz, N., & Winkielman, P. (2004) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0804_3 · Cited by 2,907
Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
Gigerenzer, G., & Brighton, H. (2009) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x · Cited by 1,801
Varieties of Memory and Consciousness: Essays in Honour of Endel Tulving
Roediger, H. L., III, & Craik, F. I. M. (2014) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,654
Cited by
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2021) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2021.02.007 · Cited by 1,360
“Research also shows that overconfidence may contribute to susceptibility to false information [38], perhaps because it stops people from slowing down and engaging in reflective reasoning [39,40].”
BackgroundSelf-citationAnalytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories
Swami, V., Voracek, M., Stieger, S., Tran, U. S., & Furnham, A. (2014) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.006 · Cited by 726
Fake news, fast and slow: Deliberation reduces belief in false (but not true) news headlines
Bago, B., Rand, D. G., & Pennycook, G. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/29b4j · Cited by 593
Self-citationFake news, fast and slow: Deliberation reduces belief in false (but not true) news headlines.
Bago, B., Rand, D. G., & Pennycook, G. (2020) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000729 · Cited by 593
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., & Pennycook, G.
- Venue
- Cognitive Psychology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-11
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 107-140
- ISSN
- 0010-0285 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2143177887
- Cited by
- 703
- References
- 126
- FWCI
- 14.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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- The paper
- Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., & Pennycook, G. (2011). Intuition, reason, and metacognition. Cognitive Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.06.001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.