Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference.
Oaksford, Mike, Chater, Nick, Larkin, Joanne·2000·Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
Cited by (8)
- Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theoryMercier, Hugo, Sperber, Dan · 2011 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Logic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm.Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. · 2002 · Psychological Bulletin
- Active Inference, Curiosity and InsightFriston, Karl J., Lin, Marco, Frith, Christopher D., Pezzulo, Giovanni, Hobson, J. Allan, Ondobaka, Sasha · 2017 · Neural Computation
- Précis of Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human ReasoningOaksford, Mike, Chater, Nick · 2009 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Conditionals and conditional probability.Evans, Jonathan St. B. T., Handley, Simon J., Over, David E. · 2003 · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- The rationality of informal argumentation: A Bayesian approach to reasoning fallacies.Hahn, Ulrike, Oaksford, Mike · 2007 · Psychological Review
- The probabilistic approach to human reasoningOaksford, Mike, Chater, Nick · 2001 · Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- The probability of causal conditionalsOver, David E., Hadjichristidis, Constantinos, Evans, Jonathan St. B.T., Handley, Simon J., Sloman, Steven A. · 2007 · Cognitive Psychology
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.