Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference.

Oaksford, Mike, Chater, Nick, Larkin, Joanne·2000·Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition

Cited by (8)

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  2. Logic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm.
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  3. Active Inference, Curiosity and Insight
    Friston, Karl J., Lin, Marco, Frith, Christopher D., Pezzulo, Giovanni, Hobson, J. Allan, Ondobaka, Sasha · 2017 · Neural Computation
  4. Précis of Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning
    Oaksford, Mike, Chater, Nick · 2009 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  5. Conditionals and conditional probability.
    Evans, Jonathan St. B. T., Handley, Simon J., Over, David E. · 2003 · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
  6. The rationality of informal argumentation: A Bayesian approach to reasoning fallacies.
    Hahn, Ulrike, Oaksford, Mike · 2007 · Psychological Review
  7. The probabilistic approach to human reasoning
    Oaksford, Mike, Chater, Nick · 2001 · Trends in Cognitive Sciences
  8. The probability of causal conditionals
    Over, David E., Hadjichristidis, Constantinos, Evans, Jonathan St. B.T., Handley, Simon J., Sloman, Steven A. · 2007 · Cognitive Psychology

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.