The DOI matches its Crossref record; 146 of the 146 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The rationality of informal argumentation: A Bayesian approach to reasoning fallacies.
Abstract
Classical informal reasoning "fallacies," for example, begging the question or arguing from ignorance, while ubiquitous in everyday argumentation, have been subject to little systematic investigation in cognitive psychology. In this article it is argued that these "fallacies" provide a rich taxonomy of argument forms that can be differentially strong, dependent on their content. A Bayesian theory of content-dependent argument strength is presented. Possible psychological mechanisms are identified. Experiments are presented investigating whether people's judgments of the strength of 3 fallacies--the argumentum ad ignorantiam, the circular argument or petitio principii, and the slippery slope argument--are affected by the factors a Bayesian account predicts. This research suggests that Bayesian accounts of reasoning can be extended to the more general human activity of argumentation.
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Cited by
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000968 · Cited by 2,254
Lieder, F., & Griffiths, T. L. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1900061x · Cited by 892
Précis of Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09000284 · Cited by 335
Self-citationReasoning Is for Arguing: Understanding the Successes and Failures of Deliberation
Mercier, H., & Landemore, H. (2012) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00873.x · Cited by 289
The Selective Laziness of Reasoning
Trouche, E., Johansson, P., Hall, L., & Mercier, H. (2016) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.12303 · Cited by 111
Metadata
- Authors
- Hahn, U., & Oaksford, M.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2007
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 704-732
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2107517384
- Cited by
- 311
- References
- 146
- FWCI
- 80.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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