Children's attributions of intentions to an invisible agent.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Children ages 3-9 years were informed that an invisible agent (Princess Alice) would help them play a forced-choice game by "telling them, somehow, when they chose the wrong box," whereas a matched control group of children were not given this supernatural prime. On 2 unexpected event trials, an experimenter triggered a simulated unexpected event (i.e., a light turning on/off; a picture falling), and children's behavioral response to these events (i.e., moving their hand to the opposite box) was coded. Results showed a significant Age GroupxExperimental Condition interaction; the only children to reliably alter their behavior in response to the unexpected events were the oldest children (M=7 years 4 months), who were primed with the invisible agent concept. For children's posttest verbal explanations, also, only these children saw the unexpected events as being referential and declarative (e.g., "Princess Alice did it because I chose the wrong box"). Together, these data suggest that children may not regularly begin to see communicative signs as embedded in unexpected events until they are around 7 years of age.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-2412 · Cited by 3,670
Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4635.001.0001 · Cited by 3,428
Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1997) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/7289.001.0001 · Cited by 1,479
The Social Brain: Mind, Language, and Society in Evolutionary Perspective
Dunbar, R. I. M. (2003) · Annual Review of Anthropology · doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.32.061002.093158 · Cited by 1,068 · cited 2×
“One speculative interpretation of these age group differences is that in order to be receptive to such supernatural signs, a child must possess a second-order theory of mind (Bering & Johnson, 2005; see also Dunbar, 2003).”
BackgroundReligion's evolutionary landscape: Counterintuition, commitment, compassion, communion
Atran, S., & Norenzayan, A. (2004) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x04000172 · Cited by 759 · cited 1×
“Or, is this tendency simply a curious, but functionless, extension of human intentionality (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 2001)?”
BackgroundBering, J. M. (2006) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x06009101 · Cited by 458
Self-citation
Cited by
Bering, J. M. (2006) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x06009101 · Cited by 458
Self-citationLearning from Others: Children's Construction of Concepts
Gelman, S. A. (2009) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093659 · Cited by 412
Blaming God for our pain: Human suffering and the divine mind
Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2010) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868309350299 · Cited by 267
“This so-called existential theory of mind leads adults to find divine signs in world events and for children to interpret surprising events as advice from invisible agents (Bering & Parker, 2006).”
BackgroundBanerjee, K., & Bloom, P. (2014) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.06.017 · Cited by 129
Metadata
- Authors
- Bering, J. M., & Parker, B. D.
- Venue
- Developmental Psychology
- Published
- 2006-03
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 253-262
- ISSN
- 0012-1649 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-0599
- OpenAlex
- W2081788385
- Cited by
- 91
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 17.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Children's attributions of intentions to an invisible agent. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037/0012-1649.42.2.253
- The paper
- Bering, J. M., & Parker, B. D. (2006). Children's attributions of intentions to an invisible agent. Developmental Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.42.2.253
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.