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Multiple explanation: A consider-an-alternative strategy for debiasing judgments.

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Hirt, Edward R., Markman, Keith D.·1995·Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
DOI 10.1037/0022-3514.69.6.1069
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Abstract

Previous research has suggested that an effective strategy for debiasing judgments is to have participants "consider the opposite." The present research proposes that considering any plausible alternative outcome for an event, not just the opposite outcome, leads participants to simulate multiple alternatives, resulting in debiased judgments. Three experiments tested this hypothesis using an explanation task paradigm. Participants in all studies were asked to explain either 1 hypothetical outcome (single explanation conditions) or 2 hypothetical outcomes (multiple explanation conditions) to an event; after the explanation task, participants made likelihood judgments. The results of Studies 1 and 2 indicated that debiasing occurred in all multiple explanation conditions, including those that did not involve the opposite outcome. Furthermore, the findings indicated that debiased judgments resulted from participants' spontaneous consideration of additional alternatives in making their likelihood judgments. The results of Study 3 also identified the perceived plausibility of the explained alternative as an important moderating variable in debiasing.

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  • It is also consistent with the general reasoning literature: considering an alternative, accessible, and plausible explanation is more likely to debias judgements.

    “It is also consistent with the general reasoning literature: considering an alternative, accessible, and plausible explanation is more likely to debias judgements (Hirt & Markman, 1995; Wharton, Cheng, & Wickens, 1993; Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002; Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004).”

    From A counterweight model for understanding and treating persecutory delusions. (2025) · cites this paper as Hirt & Markman, 1995

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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Hirt, E. R., & Markman, K. D.
Affiliations
Indiana University Bloomington (US)
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Publisher
American Psychological Association (APA)
Published
1995-12
Volume
69
Issue
6
Pages
1069-1086
ISSN
  • 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1315
DOI
10.1037/0022-3514.69.6.1069
OpenAlex
W2075078671
Cited by
354
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 15
FWCI
3.55
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
Keywords
multiple explanations, probability judgment, cognitive biases

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