Cited by 79Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentMisinformation and Its ImpactsSocial and Intergroup Psychology

It Could Have Been True: How Counterfactual Thoughts Reduce Condemnation of Falsehoods and Increase Political Polarization

Effron, Daniel A.·2018·Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Abstract

This research demonstrates how counterfactual thoughts can lead people to excuse others for telling falsehoods. When a falsehood aligned with participants’ political preferences, reflecting on how it could have been true led them to judge it as less unethical to tell, which in turn led them to judge a politician who told it as having a more moral character and deserving less punishment. When a falsehood did not align with political preferences, this effect was significantly smaller and less reliable, in part because people doubted the plausibility of the relevant counterfactual thoughts. These results emerged independently in three studies (two preregistered; total N = 2,783) and in meta- and Bayesian analyses, regardless of whether participants considered the same counterfactuals or generated their own. The results reveal how counterfactual thoughts can amplify partisan differences in judgments of alleged dishonesty. I discuss implications for theories of counterfactual thinking and motivated moral reasoning.

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  • Donald Trump supporters felt that it was less unethical to spread the falsehood that more people attended Trump's presidential inauguration than Barack Obama's after pondering a counterfactual possibility, compared to a condition in which the counterfactual was not raised.

    “For example, Donald Trump supporters felt that it was less unethical to spread the falsehood that more people attended Trump’s presidential inauguration than Barack Obama’s presidential inauguration after pondering the counterfactual possibility that “If security had been less tight at Trump’s inauguration, then more people would have attended it than Obama’s inauguration,” compared to an”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [128]

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  • People may engage in counterfactual thinking about 'what might have been' in a creative but self-serving (or group-serving) manner in order to maintain their own pre-existing attitudes.

    “Other studies suggest that people might engage in counterfactual thinking about ‘what might have been’ in a creative but self-serving (or group-serving) manner in order to maintain their own pre-existing attitudes.”
  • People may rationalize the spread of misinformation through the biased use of information about 'what might have been'.

    “Thus, people may rationalize the spread of misinformation through the biased use of information about ‘what might have been’.”

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Ditto, P. H., Pizarro, D. A., & Tannenbaum, D. (2009). Motivated moral reasoning. In H. R. Brian (Ed.), Psychology of Learning and Motivation (Vol. 50, pp. 307-338): Academic Press.
  2. Wagenmakers, E.-J., Love, J., Marsman, M., Jamil, T., Ly, A., Verhagen, J., . . . Boutin, B. (2016). Bayesian inference for psychology. Part II: example applications with JASP. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review , 1-19.

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Authors
Effron, D. A.
Affiliations
London Business School (GB)
Corresponding author
Effron, Daniel A.
Venue
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Published
2018-01-23
Volume
44
Issue
5
Pages
729-745
ISSN
  • 0146-1672 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-7433
OpenAlex
W2785189484
Cited by
79
References
63
Citations by year
2026: 13 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 1
FWCI
4.92
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • London Business School Research Online (London Business School) (acceptedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
Keywords
counterfactual reasoning, political polarization, moral judgment, political preferences, punishment judgments, partisanship
MeSH terms
Humans, Imagination, Judgment, Morals, Politics

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