(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This research examines whether people who experience epistemic motivation (i.e., a desire to acquire knowledge) came to have implicit attitudes consistent with the apparent beliefs of another person. People had lower implicit prejudice when they experienced epistemic motivation and interacted with a person who ostensibly held egalitarian beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). Implicit prejudice was not affected when people did not experience epistemic motivation. Further evidence shows that this tuning of implicit attitudes occurs when beliefs are endorsed by another person, but not when they are brought to mind via means that do not imply that person's endorsement (Experiment 3). Results suggest that implicit attitudes of epistemically motivated people tune to the apparent beliefs of others to achieve shared reality.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60214-2 · Cited by 8,822
Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.102.1.4 · Cited by 6,682
Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state.
Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1962) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0046234 · Cited by 6,223
The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating hostile and benevolent sexism.
Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1996) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.70.3.491 · Cited by 5,202
A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judgment.
Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. B. (1955) · The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0046408 · Cited by 4,819 · cited 1×
“Although research has convincingly demonstrated the influence of epistemic motivation on explicit attitudes (e.g., Darke et al., 1998; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Ford & Kruglanski, 1995; Kelman, 1961; Kruglanski, 1989; Prislin & Wood, 2005), it remains unclear whether implicit attitudes, in particular…”
ResultMotivated closing of the mind: “Seizing” and “freezing”
Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.2.263 · Cited by 2,379 · cited 3×
“…the term epistemic motivation to capture a motivational state stemming from, for example, individual differences in the need for cognitive closure, time pressure (e.g., Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), and the desire to be accurate (e.g., Darke et al., 1998; Lundgren & Prislin, 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialWilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., & Schooler, T. Y. (2000) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.107.1.101 · Cited by 2,112
Group inhibition of bystander intervention in emergencies.
Latane, B., & Darley, J. M. (1968) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0026570 · Cited by 1,252 · cited 1×
“…point to the conclusion that beliefs and judgments are formed in part by relying on the social context, particularly when people are motivated to acquire knowledge because they are uncertain of their own (e.g., Festinger, 1950, 1954; Gross, Holfz, & Miller, 1995; Latané & Darley, 1968).”
BackgroundThe Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice
Blair, I. V. (2002) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0603_8 · Cited by 1,152 · cited 1×
“Although individuals have limited conscious awareness or control of these attitudes, a growing body of research has begun to show that they are responsive to the apparent beliefs of individuals in one’s social context (Blair, 2002; Devine, 2001; Lowery et al., 2001).”
BackgroundHabits as knowledge structures: Automaticity in goal-directed behavior
Aarts, H., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2000) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.78.1.53 · Cited by 972 · cited 1×
“…and motivations can be activated automatically and guide cognitive processing and behavior in ways that are not subject to conscious awareness (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Gollwitzer & Bargh, 2005;…”
Background
Cited by
A meta-analysis of procedures to change implicit measures
Forscher, P. S., Lai, C. K., Axt, J. R., Ebersole, C. R., Herman, M., Devine, P. G., & Nosek, B. A. (2019) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspa0000160 · Cited by 700
Shared Reality: Experiencing Commonality with others' Inner States about the World
Echterhoff, G., Higgins, E. T., & Levine, J. M. (2009) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01161.x · Cited by 677
Health on impulse: When low self-control promotes healthy food choices
Salmon, S. J., Fennis, B. M., de Ridder, D. T. D., Adriaanse, M. A., & de Vet, E. (2014) · Health Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0031785 · Cited by 150
Aversive Racism and Contemporary Bias
Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., & Pearson, A. R. (2016) · The Cambridge Handbook of the Psychology of Prejudice · doi:10.1017/9781316161579.012 · Cited by 141
Metadata
- Authors
- Lun, J., Sinclair, S., Whitchurch, E. R., & Glenn, C.
- Venue
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Published
- 2007
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 957-972
- ISSN
- 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1315
- OpenAlex
- W2152695619
- Cited by
- 111
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 16.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: (Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037/0022-3514.93.6.957
- The paper
- Lun, J., Sinclair, S., Whitchurch, E. R., & Glenn, C. (2007). (Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.6.957
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.