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Cited by 182

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Reasoning From Inconsistency to Consistency.

Johnson-Laird, P. N., Girotto, Vittorio, Legrenzi, Paolo·2004·Psychological Review

Abstract

This article presents a theory of how individuals reason from inconsistency to consistency. The theory is based on 3 main principles. First, individuals try to construct a single mental model of a possibility that satisfies a current set of propositions, and if the task is impossible, they infer that the set is inconsistent. Second, when an inconsistency arises from an incontrovertible fact, they retract any singularly dubious proposition or any proposition that is inconsistent with the fact; otherwise, they retract whichever proposition mismatches the fact. A mismatch can arise from a proposition that has only mental models that conflict with the fact or fail to represent it. Third, individuals use their causal knowledge-in the form of models of possibilities-to create explanations of what led to the inconsistency. A computer program implements the theory, and experimental results support each of its principles.

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Metadata

Authors
Johnson-Laird, P. N., Girotto, V., & Legrenzi, P.
Venue
Psychological Review
Published
2004
Volume
111
Issue
3
Pages
640-661
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
OpenAlex
W2018933013
Cited by
182
References
3
FWCI
6.44
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Reasoning From Inconsistency to Consistency. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037/0033-295x.111.3.640
The paper
Johnson-Laird, P. N., Girotto, V., & Legrenzi, P. (2004). Reasoning From Inconsistency to Consistency. Psychological Review. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.111.3.640

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.