The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reasoning From Inconsistency to Consistency.
Abstract
This article presents a theory of how individuals reason from inconsistency to consistency. The theory is based on 3 main principles. First, individuals try to construct a single mental model of a possibility that satisfies a current set of propositions, and if the task is impossible, they infer that the set is inconsistent. Second, when an inconsistency arises from an incontrovertible fact, they retract any singularly dubious proposition or any proposition that is inconsistent with the fact; otherwise, they retract whichever proposition mismatches the fact. A mismatch can arise from a proposition that has only mental models that conflict with the fact or fail to represent it. Third, individuals use their causal knowledge-in the form of models of possibilities-to create explanations of what led to the inconsistency. A computer program implements the theory, and experimental results support each of its principles.
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Cites
The complexity of theorem-proving procedures
Cook, S. A. (1971) · Proceedings of the third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '71 · doi:10.1145/800157.805047 · Cited by 6,385
Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking.
James, W. (1907) · doi:10.1037/10851-000 · Cited by 1,804
Thagard, P. (1992) · doi:10.1515/9780691186672 · Cited by 1,066
Cited by
Science Education International
(2019) · Science education international · doi:10.33828/sei · Cited by 1,069
Mental models and human reasoning
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1012933107 · Cited by 575
Self-citationUnderstanding all inconsistency compensation as a palliative response to violated expectations
Proulx, T., Inzlicht, M., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2012) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.04.002 · Cited by 399
Feeling ambivalent about going green
Chang, C. (2011) · Journal of Advertising · doi:10.2753/joa0091-3367400402 · Cited by 391
Back to the Future of Dissonance Theory: Cognitive Consistency as a Core Motive
Gawronski, B. (2012) · Social Cognition · doi:10.1521/soco.2012.30.6.652 · Cited by 342
Metadata
- Authors
- Johnson-Laird, P. N., Girotto, V., & Legrenzi, P.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2004
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 640-661
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2018933013
- Cited by
- 182
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 6.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Johnson-Laird, P. N., Girotto, V., & Legrenzi, P. (2004). Reasoning From Inconsistency to Consistency. Psychological Review. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.111.3.640
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.