The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Heuristic and linear models of judgment: Matching rules and environments.
Open accessAbstract
Much research has highlighted incoherent implications of judgmental heuristics, yet other findings have demonstrated high correspondence between predictions and outcomes. At the same time, judgment has been well modeled in the form of as if linear models. Accepting the probabilistic nature of the environment, the authors use statistical tools to model how the performance of heuristic rules varies as a function of environmental characteristics. They further characterize the human use of linear models by exploring effects of different levels of cognitive ability. They illustrate with both theoretical analyses and simulations. Results are linked to the empirical literature by a meta-analysis of lens model studies. Using the same tasks, the authors estimate the performance of both heuristics and humans where the latter are assumed to use linear models. Their results emphasize that judgmental accuracy depends on matching characteristics of rules and environments and highlight the trade-off between using linear models and heuristics. Whereas the former can be cognitively demanding, the latter are simple to implement. However, heuristics require knowledge to indicate when they should be used.
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Cites
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Self-citation
Cited by
Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346 · Cited by 4,037
Mindful Judgment and Decision Making
Weber, E. U., & Johnson, E. J. (2009) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163633 · Cited by 745
Strategies for revising judgment: How (and how well) people use others’ opinions.
Soll, J. B., & Larrick, R. P. (2009) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition · doi:10.1037/a0015145 · Cited by 416
Dicks, M., Button, C., & Davids, K. (2010) · Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics · doi:10.3758/app.72.3.706 · Cited by 351
Risk, uncertainty, and heuristics
Mousavi, S., & Gigerenzer, G. (2014) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.02.013 · Cited by 335
Metadata
- Authors
- Hogarth, R. M., & Karelaia, N.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2007
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 733-758
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2022141716
- Cited by
- 307
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 16.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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