The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Children and adults as intuitive scientists.
Abstract
The metaphor of children and lay adults as intuitive scientists has gained wide acceptance. Although useful in one sense, pertaining to scientific understanding, in another, pertaining to the process of scientific thinking, the metaphor may be fundamentally misleading. Research is reviewed indicating that processes of scientific thinking differ significantly in children, lay adults, and scientists. Hence, it is the instruments of scientific thinking, not just the products, that undergo "strong restructuring" (Carey, 1986). A framework for conceptualizing development of scientific thinking processes is proposed, centering on progressive differentiation and coordination of theory and evidence. This development is metacognitive, as well as strategic. It requires thinking about theories, rather than merely with them, and thinking about evidence, rather than merely being influenced by it, and, hence, reflects the attainment of control over the interaction of theories and evidence in one's own thinking.
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“In addition, it appears that children (and even some adults) do not make the same sharp distinction between theories and evidence that scientists do (Carey, Evans, Honda, Jay, & Unger, 1989; D. Kuhn, 1989; D. Kuhn, Amsel, & O'Loughlin, 1988).”
From The role of anomalous data in knowledge acquisition: A theoretical framework and implications for science instruction. (1993) · cites this paper as D. Kuhn, 1989
In the citing paper
“A large body of developmental research indicates that children (and even many adults) are deficient in their understanding of such methodological matters as controlled experimentation and the interpretation of covariation information (e.g., Gil & Carrascosa, 1985;Kuhn, 1989;Kuhn et al., 1988;Schauble, 1990;Shaklee & Elek, 1988;Shaklee & Goldston, 1989).”
From The role of anomalous data in knowledge acquisition: A theoretical framework and implications for science instruction. (1993) · cites this paper as Kuhn, 1989
In the citing paper
“a.An explicit understanding of the relationship between theory and evidence (Kuhn, 1989).”
From The role of anomalous data in knowledge acquisition: A theoretical framework and implications for science instruction. (1993) · cites this paper as Kuhn, 1989
Citations
Cites
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Kuhn, T. S., & Schlegel, R. (1963) · Physics Today · doi:10.1063/1.3050879 · Cited by 35,538
Vygotsky, L. S. (1964) · Bulletin of the Orton Society · doi:10.1007/bf02928399 · Cited by 20,704
The growth of logical thinking: From childhood to adolescence.
Inhelder, B., & Piaget, J. (1958) · Basic Books · doi:10.1037/10034-000 · Cited by 4,607
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.
Cherniak, C., Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. D. (1983) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184495 · Cited by 4,196
Conceptual Change in Childhood
Carey, S. E. (1985) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 3,851
Review of Child Development Research
Walters, J., Hoffman, M. L., & Hoffman, L. W. (1965) · Journal of Marriage and the Family · doi:10.2307/349834 · Cited by 3,658
The Psychology Of Intelligence
Piaget, J. (2005) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203981528 · Cited by 3,032
Miller, G. A., & Cantor, N. E. (1982) · Social Cognition · doi:10.1521/soco.1982.1.1.83 · Cited by 2,862
Beyond IQ: A Triarchic Theory of Human Intelligence
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The role of theories in conceptual coherence.
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Sorted by citations
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises
Nickerson, R. S. (1998) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175 · Cited by 7,267
Schraw, G., Crippen, K. J., & Hartley, K. (2006) · Research in Science Education · doi:10.1007/s11165-005-3917-8 · Cited by 1,529
Schraw, G., & Moshman, D. (1995) · Educational Psychology Review · doi:10.1007/bf02212307 · Cited by 1,443
Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. F. (1993) · Review of Educational Research · doi:10.3102/00346543063001001 · Cited by 1,393
Metadata
- Authors
- Kuhn, D.
- Affiliations
- Columbia University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Kuhn, Deanna
- ORCID
- Kuhn, Deanna
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 1989
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 674-689
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W1972191699
- Cited by
- 774
- References
- 57
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 41 · 2019: 22 · 2018: 37 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 30 · 2014: 25 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 35
- FWCI
- 139.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Education › Science Education and Pedagogy
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Educational Strategies and Epistemologies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Keywords
- scientific thinking, children's scientific thinking, scientific reasoning, theory and evidence, metacognition, meta-reasoning, cognitive development, conceptual framework
- MeSH terms
- Child, Cognition, Female, Humans, Human Development, Male, Models, Psychological, Problem Solving, Science, Thinking
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