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Bayesian generic priors for causal learning.
Open accessAbstract
The article presents a Bayesian model of causal learning that incorporates generic priors--systematic assumptions about abstract properties of a system of cause-effect relations. The proposed generic priors for causal learning favor sparse and strong (SS) causes--causes that are few in number and high in their individual powers to produce or prevent effects. The SS power model couples these generic priors with a causal generating function based on the assumption that unobservable causal influences on an effect operate independently (P. W. Cheng, 1997). The authors tested this and other Bayesian models, as well as leading nonnormative models, by fitting multiple data sets in which several parameters were varied parametrically across multiple types of judgments. The SS power model accounted for data concerning judgments of both causal strength and causal structure (whether a causal link exists). The model explains why human judgments of causal structure (relative to a Bayesian model lacking these generic priors) are influenced more by causal power and the base rate of the effect and less by sample size. Broader implications of the Bayesian framework for human learning are discussed.
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Cites
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“Our simulation uses generic priors identical to those used in the simulations of experiments with adults, reported above, coupled with a specific prior that the background does not activate the blicket detector (consistent with the instructions that Gopnik et al., 2001, gave to children in their study). Table C1 in Ap…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationMotion illusions as optimal percepts
Weiss, Y., Simoncelli, E. P., & Adelson, E. H. (2002) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn0602-858 · Cited by 1,076
A symbolic-connectionist theory of relational inference and generalization.
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Self-citationSimplicity: a unifying principle in cognitive science?
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Seeing Versus Doing: Two Modes of Accessing Causal Knowledge.
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Cited by
How to grow a mind: Statistics, structure, and abstraction
Tenenbaum, J. B., Kemp, C., Griffiths, T. L., & Goodman, N. D. (2011) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1192788 · Cited by 1,815
Reconstructing constructivism: Causal models, Bayesian learning mechanisms, and the theory theory.
Gopnik, A., & Wellman, H. M. (2012) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0028044 · Cited by 663
Probabilistic models of cognition: exploring representations and inductive biases
Griffiths, T. L., Chater, N., Kemp, C., Perfors, A., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.05.004 · Cited by 568
Advances in Bayesian network modelling: Integration of modelling technologies
Marcot, B. G., & Penman, T. D. (2019) · Environmental Modelling & Software · doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2018.09.016 · Cited by 429
Causal inference in perception
Shams, L., & Beierholm, U. R. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.07.001 · Cited by 403
Metadata
- Authors
- Lu, H., Yuille, A. L., Liljeholm, M., Cheng, P. W., & Holyoak, K. J.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2008-10
- Volume
- 115
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 955-984
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2119991646
- Cited by
- 200
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 21.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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