Representation in Cognitive Science
Open accessAbstract
The representational theory of mind (RTM) has given us the powerful insight that thinking consists of the processing of mental representations. Behaviour is the result of these cognitive processes and makes sense in the light of their contents. There is no widely accepted account of how representations get their content – of the metaphysics of representational content. That question, usually asked about representations at the personal level like beliefs and conscious states, is equally pressing for the subpersonal representations that pervade our best explanatory theories in cognitive science. This book argues that well-understood naturalistic resources can be combined to provide an account of subpersonal representational content. It shows how contents arise in a series of detailed case studies in cognitive science. The account is pluralistic, allowing that content is constituted differently in different cases. Building on insights from previous theories, especially teleosemantics, the accounts combine an appeal to correlational information and structural correspondence with an expanded notion of etiological function, which captures the kinds of stabilizing processes that give rise to content. The accounts support a distinction between descriptive and directive content. They also allow us to see how representational explanation gets its distinctive explanatory purchase.
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Philosophers of cognitive science have largely reached a consensus on the key factors that enable internal states in a system to become representations, both basic and complex.
“What matters for our limited purposes is that, despite some disagreements on the finer details, philosophers of cognitive science have largely reached a consensus on the key factors that enable internal states in a system to become representations, both basic and complex (Coelho Mollo, 2022;Shea, 2018).”
From The Vector Grounding Problem (2026) · cites this paper as Shea, 2018
A causal-informational relation must be exploited-used by the system due to its information-carrying nature-for it to contribute to basic representational content.
“An additional requirement often mentioned is that the causal-informational relation be exploited, that is, used by the system due to its information-carrying nature (Shea, 2018).”
From The Vector Grounding Problem (2026) · cites this paper as Shea, 2018
The internal states of the swamp system, at least at the moment of creation, would lack any causal-informational relations to the world and lack any functions, including functions to carry information about the world.
“First, the internal states of the swamp system, at least at the moment of creation, would lack any causal-informational relations to the world, given that, by hypothesis, the system has no causal history.Moreover, the absence of a selection and learning history means that the internal states of the swamp system lack any functions, including functions to carry information about the world (Shea, 201”
From The Vector Grounding Problem (2026) · cites this paper as Shea, 2018
The parameter values themselves cannot ground representational content; what matters for grounding is the historical process through which those parameters were selected to perform specific functions.
“The parameter values themselves cannot ground representational content.It is worth noting, however, that referential grounding could be established relatively quickly if 𝑀 2 were subsequently fine-tuned.Even a brief learning history would begin to establish the relevant world-involving functions (Shea, 2018).What matters for grounding is not the parameter values per se, but the historical process”
From The Vector Grounding Problem (2026) · cites this paper as Shea, 2018
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“Many now use the term representation to mean a state of a cognitive system, i.e., neural network, that responds selectively to certain bodily and environmental conditions (Shea, 2018).”
BackgroundDo we represent peripersonal space?
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- Authors
- Shea, N.
- Affiliations
- University of London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Shea, Nicholas
- ORCID
- Shea, Nicholas
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2018-10-04
- OpenAlex
- W4213308377
- Cited by
- 676
- References
- 16
- Citations by year
- 2026: 85 · 2025: 50 · 2024: 169 · 2023: 110 · 2022: 98 · 2021: 73 · 2020: 76 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 3
- FWCI
- 47.64
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- BiblioBoard Library Catalog (Open Research Library) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Directory of Open access Books (OAPEN Foundation) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- representational content, representational theory of mind, teleosemantics, structural correspondence, descriptive content, naturalism
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